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The Mobile Health Revolution?
Nathan Cortez*
Rarely does a class of technologies excite physicians, patients,
financeers, gadgeteers, and policymakers alike. But mobile health —
the use of mobile devices like smartphones and tablets for health or
medical purposes — has captured our collective imagination.
Observers predict that mobile health, also known as “mHealth” or by
products called “medical apps,” can save millions of lives, billions in
spending, and democratize access to health care. Proponents argue that
mobile health technologies will transform the ways in which we
deliver, consume, measure, and pay for care, disrupting our sclerotic
health care system.
This Article evaluates mobile health and its many ambitions. Given
the significant hype surrounding mobile health, I try to provide a more
sober review of the many claims here. I begin by surveying the universe
of mobile health technologies, offering a typology of products based on
their functions, many of which have regulatory significance.
The Article then considers the federal government’s posture towards
mobile health. To date, Congress and over half a dozen federal
agencies have addressed these technologies. Contrary to the prevailing
wisdom, federal regulators are sympathetic, not hostile, to mobile
*
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health products. However, I demonstrate how one agency, the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), is repeating the same
mistakes that it made when it first confronted medical device software
twenty-five years ago, relying on nonbinding guidance documents that
are largely weak and unenforceable. I argue that, somewhat
counterintuitively, mobile health will only reach its immense potential
if regulators like the FDA provide meaningful oversight. Otherwise,
users will be flooded with mobile technologies that are ineffective, or
worse, unsafe.
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INTRODUCTION
The video begins with the deep, familiar drum of a heartbeat,
overlaid with piano staccato and flashes of internal organs observable
only through modern machinery. The narrator begins: “Technology
has given us an unprecedented view into the human body. But on a
day-to-day basis, we’re still in the dark about our own health.”
Staccato gives way to more buoyant notes. “We are changing that.”
The video continues with three vignettes  all concerned parents
with young children. In the first, a father uses a smartphone to scan
his son’s rash, which the phone matches against a database of
archetypes. The phone advises, “Roseola rash. Recommended action:
Rest at home.” The father turns to his wife, relieved, “Rest at home.
It’s okay.”
In the second vignette, a mother relaxes on her couch with a tablet
computer, when an alert warns, “Whooping Cough in your area.” The
tablet recommends a DTaP vaccination for her daughter, which the
mother schedules with a few taps on the screen.
In the third vignette, two worried parents use a smartphone to
measure a 103.8 degree fever in their young daughter. The phone
prompts for additional symptoms. In response, it recommends a
urinalysis, which the father performs with peripherals that plug into
his phone. The software advises “Urinary Tract Infection. Visit Urgent
Care Now,” displaying a route to the nearest hospital.
The narrator closes: “We’re building a way for people to check their
bodies as often as they check their email. It’s all possible. And it’s only
the beginning.”
The video is by Scanadu,1 a medical technology company that
resides at NASA’s Ames Research Center in Silicon Valley.2 Since 2010,
the company has been trying to create a real life version of the
Tricorder, the mythical, universal diagnostic device used by Dr.
McCoy on Star Trek.3 Three years later, Scanadu claims to have done
1
SCANADU, http://www.scanadu.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2014); see Ivo Clarysse,
Scanadu Trailer, YOUTUBE (Oct. 11, 2011), http://youtu.be/KSwMauCno6o.
2
NASA Research Park: Partners: Scanadu, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ames/researchpark/partners/industry/scanadu.html (last
visited June 24, 2013).
3
Indeed, Scanadu has become almost synonymous in the media with efforts to
develop the Tricorder. See, e.g., Press Mentions, SCANADU, http://www.scanadu.com/
press_mentions/ (last visited June 24, 2013) (citing various news article headlines
likening Scanadu to the Tricorder); see also Mark P. Mills, Tricorder Update: Social
Medicine Is the Next Big Thing After Social Media, FORBES (May 21, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/markpmills/2012/05/21/tricorder-update-social-medicine-isthe-next-big-thing-after-social-media/ (calling Scanadu’s innovation a “protean medical
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so with its first product, the Scout  a small, puck-shaped device that
measures vital signs like temperature, heart rate, blood oxygenation,
blood pressure, and what it calls “emotional stress,” when held against
the forehead.4 The Scout uses various algorithms and sensors, some of
which derive from NASA’s Mars Curiosity Rover mission.5 Scanadu
broke fundraising records when it launched a campaign on the
crowdfunding site Indiegogo.6 It is now soliciting participants for
usability studies that the company hopes will lead to marketing
clearance by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”).7
Scanadu’s marketing line is “Sapere Aude” (“Dare to Know”).8 And its
website invites users to “[i]magine the tools of an emergency room
from the comfort of your living room.”9 If successful, the company
could win a $10 million award from the X Prize Foundation, which in
2011 created a competition for the first group to create a medical
Tricorder.10
In many ways, Scanadu embodies the nascent mobile health
industry and its boundless ambitions. “Mobile health,” or “mHealth,”
is the use of mobile communications devices like smartphones and
tablet computers for health or medical purposes, usually for diagnosis,
treatment, or simply well-being and maintenance. Most mobile health
technologies interface with users through applications (“apps”)
downloaded onto iPhones, iPads, or Android or Windows devices, for
example.

Tricorder”). See generally Harry McCracken, Scanadu Aims to Turn Smartphones into
Healthcare Helpers, TIME (Nov. 29, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/11/29/scanaduaims-to-turn-smartphones-into-healthcare-helpers/ (describing Scanadu’s features).
4
Scanadu Scout, the First Medical Tricorder, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/
projects/scanadu-scout-the-first-medical-tricorder?website_name=scanaduscout
(last
visited June 24, 2013) (using the term “emotional stress”); see also Matt Peckham, A Star
Trek Tricorder? ‘Scanadu Scout’ Health Monitor Surges Past Indiegogo Funding Goal, TIME
(May 24, 2013), http://ti.me/14Z2QGE; Scanadu Scout, SCANADU, http://www.scanadu.
com/scout.
5
See INDIEGOGO, supra note 4.
6
See Ki Mae Heussner, Scanadu’s Medical ‘Tricorder’ Sets Record for Fastest
Funding Velocity on Indiegogo, GIGAOM (May 24, 2013), http://gigaom.com/2013/05/24/
scanadus-medical-tricorder-sets-record-for-fastest-funding-velocity-on-indiegogo/.
7
See INDIEGOGO, supra note 4.
8
See id.
9
SCANADU, supra note 1.
10
See Jesse Sunenblick, X Prize: Making the Tricorder a Reality, WIRED (Feb. 17,
2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2013/02/features/tricorder; QUALCOMM
TRICORDER X PRIZE, http://www.qualcommtricorderxprize.org/ (last visited June 24,
2013).
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In addition to the Scout, we now have technologies that allow us to
use smartphones to control FDA-regulated devices like blood pressure
cuffs, ultrasound machines, and insulin pumps. Other mobile health
apps can link smartphones to hundreds of hospital monitors, allowing
physicians to track patient vital signs remotely. Some apps allow
physicians and patients to view CT scans, MRIs, PET scans, and other
medical images remotely.11 Others allow patients to listen to abnormal
heart, lung, and bowel sounds, or track their blood-glucose levels
using their phones. And still others try to turn smartphones into allin-one diagnostic tools like the Scout.12
Some mobile health applications target patient users. Some target
health care professionals. Many do not discriminate.
Mobile health applications often take advantage of a smartphone’s
built-in features, like touch screens, cameras, gyroscopes, lights,
sounds, and wireless connectivity  as well as software that processes
interactive questionnaires, algorithms, formulae, calculators, clinical
decision support tools, and other parameters. Used in combination,
mobile health applications can generate customized diagnoses and
treatment recommendations by comparing user-specific data to vast
bodies of clinical research and accumulated medical knowledge.
Mobile apps are turning phones into medical devices.
Mobile health might digitize the ways in which we deliver,
consume, measure, and pay for health care. Some believe mobile
health will reduce medical errors, improve quality care, and save
millions of lives. Others posit that it will save us billions in health
spending by preventing more serious, acute episodes of illness. Mobile
health may also decentralize and demystify medicine by shifting the
locus of care away from expensive medical facilities and professionals,
and towards digitally-empowered patients.
Mobile health could provide a much needed shock to the U.S. health
care system. Smartphones already are replacing stethoscopes and
pagers as the most ubiquitous physician accessory.13 The number of
11

“CT” is “computed tomography.” “MRI” is “magnetic resonance imaging.” And
“PET” is “positron emission tomography.” Each uses different methods to view
internal organs, structures, and tissues. STEDMAN’S CONCISE MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR
THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 236, 636, 751 (4th ed. 2001).
12
For a brief snapshot of the history of mobile health devices that connect to other
medical devices, including many described in this paragraph, see Aditi Pai, Jonah
Comstock & Brian Dolan, Timeline: Smartphone-Enabled Health Devices, MOBIHEALTHNEWS
(June 7, 2013), http://mobihealthnews.com/22674/timeline-smartphone-enabled-healthdevices/.
13
For a physician’s perspective on this phenomenon, see WILLIAM HANSON, SMART
MEDICINE: HOW THE CHANGING ROLE OF DOCTORS WILL REVOLUTIONIZE HEALTH CARE
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smartphone users downloading health applications roughly doubles
every year, and is expected to hit 500 million by 2015.14 Today, Apple
offers around 13,000 different health applications for consumers in its
App Store, not counting the many more targeted at doctors and
nurses,15 or yet more offered on other device platforms. The $10
million Tricorder X Prize is but an emblem of the excitement.16 Even
policymakers see the potential, hoping that mobile health can
accomplish what has eluded them for decades: the Holy Trinity of
reducing costs, improving quality, and expanding access to care.
The mobile health revolution is in many ways the convergence of
several panoramic trends, including evidence-based medicine,
personalized medicine, consumer-driven health care, coordinated care,
pay-for-performance, the “quantified self” movement, and even
broader evolutions in science, technology, and society.17 In short,
mobile health sits at the intersection of several converging
phenomena, and our collective response to it is worth studying.18
This Article evaluates mobile health and its many possibilities. I
argue that for mobile health to reach its immense potential, regulators
must not only try to facilitate these technologies, but also ensure that

19-22 (2011).
14
See Elizabeth Orr, 2011 in Review: MDUFA, 510(k) Debate Made List of Top
News, in DEVICES & DIAGNOSTICS LETTER 2 (Jan. 2, 2012) (citing a study by
research2guidance).
15
See Brian Dolan, Report: 13K iPhone Consumer Health Apps in 2012,
MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://mobihealthnews.com/13368/report-13kiphone-consumer-health-apps-in-2012/.
16
See Torie Bosch, Inspired by Star Trek, $10 Million X-Prize Searches for Real-Life
Tricorder, SLATE (Jan. 10, 2012), http://slate.me/xukOY5 (hoping that the winner’s
device will “allow a user to diagnose themselves without having to visit a doctor or
hospital”). For the final guidelines, see Competition Guidelines, QUALCOMM TRICORDER
X PRIZE (July 1, 2013), http://www.qualcommtricorderxprize.org/competitiondetails/competition-guidelines.
17
For example, there is a rich literature in the Science, Technology, and Society
discipline that examines problems related to scientific and technological innovation.
The scholarship ranges from Thomas Kuhn’s famous 1962 book, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, to work by modern founders like Sheila Jasanoff. Although these
debates are beyond the scope of this Article, the legal questions I address no doubt
benefit from their perspectives.
18
See Kenneth W. Goodman, Ethical and Legal Issues in Decision Support, in
CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 137 (Eta S. Berner ed., 2d.
ed. 2007) (“[T]he debate over medical software regulation represents one of the most
important controversies of the Computer Age. The balancing of risks and benefits, as
well as public safety and technological progress, means that scientists, clinicians, and
policy makers have one of civilization’s most interesting  and challenging 
tasks.”).
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they are safe and effective. To date, Congress and over half a dozen
federal agencies, including the FDA, the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”), the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the
Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, and various
subagencies of the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”), have addressed mobile health.19
The tenor of their responses, with some exceptions, has been
optimistic and aspirational. I argue, somewhat counterintuitively, that
the mobile health market will flourish long-term only if it is subjected
to a healthy dose of skepticism from federal regulators, particularly the
FDA. The FDA, and perhaps also the FTC, is in the best position to
prevent U.S. health policy (and spending) from being dictated by
“technological solutionism,” the idea that technology can solve any
and all of our problems, no matter how complicated or persistent.20
Without meaningful regulatory oversight, users might be flooded with
mobile technologies that are ineffective, or worse, unsafe.
I begin in Part I by surveying the universe of mobile health
technologies and offering a typology of products based on their
functions. For example, some mobile health apps connect to FDAregulated medical devices, amplifying their capabilities. Others
replicate the functionality of traditional devices. Some automate and
customize diagnoses or treatment recommendations based on patientspecific inputs. And others do more. These functions have regulatory
significance and present discrete benefits and risks.
Part II then evaluates the many ambitions of mobile health. I
examine claims that mobile health can save millions of lives, billions
in spending, and democratize access to medicine. Given the significant
hype surrounding mobile health, I try to offer a relatively sober,
dispassionate review of the many claims here.21
Given these claims, Part III considers the federal government’s
posture towards mobile health. As noted above, both Congress and
over half a dozen federal agencies are actively monitoring mobile
19

See infra Part III.
See EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF
TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM 5-6 (2013). For a critical review by a legal scholar, see Tim
Wu, Book Review: ‘To Save Everything, Click Here,’ by Evgeny Morozov, WASH. POST (Apr.
12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/book-review-to-save-everythingclick-here-by-evgeny-morozov/2013/04/12/0e82400a-9ac9-11e2-9a79-eb5280c81c63_
story.html (describing “solutionism” as “the idea that deep and serious problems can be
solved with a few cute apps”).
21
The need for more detached, critical evaluations of new Internet technologies
and their social implications is highlighted, in rather scathing terms, by MOROZOV,
supra note 20, at 18-20.
20
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health technologies. I pay particular attention to the FDA, the agency
responsible for ensuring that new medical devices are safe and
effective. I demonstrate that, contrary to the prevailing wisdom,
federal regulators are sympathetic, not hostile, to mobile health. To
most observers, this is entirely reasonable.
However, as I demonstrate in Part IV, the FDA is repeating some of
the same mistakes that it made when first confronting medical device
software twenty-five years ago. In 1987, the FDA published a draft
software guidance,22 partly in response to several deaths caused by the
first radiation machines operated by software. The FDA then relied on
the draft guidance for the next eighteen years, withdrawing the policy
unceremoniously in 2005,23 leaving nothing in its place. The FDA
never promulgated comprehensive software regulations and never
even finalized the draft policy. All of this happened during a profound
computer revolution, no less, when software became increasingly
ubiquitous and critical to patient safety.
Likewise, the FDA now relies on nonbinding guidance to explain its
tentative approach to mobile health, specifying the types of apps that it
may and may not regulate.24 The agency is thus adopting the same
posture it did when first confronting medical device software twentyfive years ago, building on a scaffolding of nonbinding guidance
documents that are largely unenforceable. I show how recent tragedies
caused by the latest generation of radiation software echo the same
problems that first prompted FDA involvement in the mid-1980s.
Given this evidence, I argue that the FDA should confront its past
regulatory failures and push itself into a regulatory “feedback loop,” in
which the agency can identify past shortcomings and correct them
22
Draft Policy for the Regulation of Computer Products, 52 Fed. Reg. 36,104
(Sept. 25, 1987); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT POLICY FOR THE REGULATION OF
COMPUTER PRODUCTS (Nov. 13, 1989), available at 1989 WL 1178702 [hereinafter
FDA DRAFT SOFTWARE POLICY].
23
Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug
Administration, 70 Fed. Reg. 824, 890 (Jan. 5, 2005).
24
In July 2011, the FDA published a Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Apps. U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF: MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS (July 21, 2011) [hereinafter FDA
DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS], http://www.genomicslawreport.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/FDA-mHealth-Draft-Guidance.pdf; see also Draft Guidance
for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff; Mobile Medical Applications;
Availability, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,689 (July 21, 2011). In September 2013, the FDA finalized
the guidance. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (Sept. 25, 2013) [hereinafter FDA
FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS], available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM263366.pdf.
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going forward. For example, if draft guidances become obsolete, the
agency should update them. And if the FDA declares enforceable
principles via guidance or elsewhere, it should enforce them.
For the mobile health revolution to succeed, regulators will need to
provide genuine oversight, not just cheerleading.
I.

A TYPOLOGY OF MOBILE HEALTH

The mobile health revolution began on June 29, 2007. On that day,
Apple released the first iPhone, perhaps “the most anticipated gadget
of all time.”25 Twenty months later, on stage in front of thousands at
the World Wide Developer’s Conference, an Apple executive
connected an iPhone to a blood pressure monitor, and an executive
from the Johnson & Johnson subsidiary LifeScan connected an iPhone
to a blood glucose meter.26 The Apple executive observed, “We think
this is profound.”27 Although mobile health can trace its roots back
further, to personal digital assistants (“PDAs”), websites like WebMD,
and even early electronic medical records,28 the first iPhone
introduced an era of torrential creativity with mobile communications
devices.
Barely five years later, and the mobile health revolution is well
underway. Physicians, nurses, entrepreneurs, financeers, gadgeteers,
futurists, and even policymakers can barely contain their excitement.29
Media stories feature breathless quotes about the transformation of
medicine.30 Part II, below, evaluates these claims.
But before doing so, Part I introduces mobile health technologies,
evaluating the first generation of mobile applications and previewing
later generations that may do much more. I present a typology of
25
Brian X. Chen, June 29, 2007: iPhone, You Phone, We All Wanna iPhone, WIRED
(June 29, 2009), http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/2009/06/dayintech_0629/.
26
See Pai et al., supra note 12.
27
Id.
28
See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Health
Care, 13 NEV. L.J. 722 (2013) (tracing the recent history of health information
technology (“HIT”), beginning with the Institute of Medicine’s call for HIT in 2001
and continuing on to medical apps).
29
See infra Part II.
30
See, e.g., Katie Hafner, For a Second Opinion, Consult a Computer?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/health/quest-to-eliminate-diagnosticlapses.html (discussing the history of computer-assisted diagnostics and how it has
evolved); Katie Hafner, Redefining Medicine with Apps and iPads, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/science/redefining-medicine-with-apps-and-ipadsthe-digital-doctor.html?_r=0 (exploring how young doctors are utilizing iPhone apps in
practice).
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mobile health applications, categorized largely by their functionality.
Of course, with an estimated 97,000 mobile health apps on the market
in 2013,31 any typology will necessarily oversimplify. But the typology
largely reflects how regulators like the FDA divide the market.32
Finally, to truly appreciate these technologies, one must see them in
action, and for that reason I cite to such sources infra.
A. Connectors
The first category of applications connects smartphones and tablets
to FDA-regulated devices, thus amplifying the devices’ functionalities.
For example, applications now enable clinicians to use their
smartphones to view and manipulate medical images, analyze
electroencephalograms (“EEGs”) or electrocardiograms (“ECGs”),
connect to bedside monitors, screen blood samples, or act as wireless
remote controls for medical devices.33
In this latter category, several applications allow users to control
FDA-regulated devices. Examples include apps that allow users to
inflate and deflate blood pressure cuffs,34 perform portable
ultrasounds,35 operate insulin pumps,36 and visually track whether
wounds heal or regress.37 Other apps also display, analyze, or transmit

31
See Mobile Health Market Report 2013–2017: The Commercialization of mHealth
Applications (Vol. 3), RESEARCH2GUIDANCE 7 (Mar. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Report 2013–
2017], http://www.research2guidance.com/shop/index.php/downloadable/download/
sample/sample_id/262/.
32
See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 18-20.
33
See id. at 18 (listing examples).
34
See, e.g., Blood Pressure Monitor, WITHINGS, http://withings.com/en/
bloodpressuremonitor (last visited June 24, 2013) (displaying blood pressure cuff and
accompanying blood pressure monitor application); iHealth BPM, ITUNES PREVIEW,
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/ihealth-bpm/id391469141?mt=8 (last visited June 24,
2013) (enabling users to monitor their own blood pressure).
35
See MOBISANTE, http://www.mobisante.com/ (last visited June 24, 2013)
(demonstrating and describing the MobiUS SP1 ultrasound imaging system). The FDA
cleared the MobiUS for marketing in January 2011. See MobiSante, Inc., Section 5 —
510(k) Summary (FDA Form 510(k)) 3 (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.accessdata.fda.
gov/cdrh_docs/pdf10/K102153.pdf.
36
See OMNIPOD, http://www.myomnipod.com/VPDMweb/index.html (last visited
June 24, 2013).
37
See, e.g., Silhouette Advanced Wound Assessment and Management System, ARANZ
MED., LTD., http://test.aranzmedical.com/products/silhouette-suite/ (last visited Jan. 1,
2014) (describing Silhouette, a wound assessment application); Aranz Medical Ltd.,
510(k) Summary of Safety and Effectiveness (FDA Form 510(k)) (Jan. 17, 2007),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf7/K070426.pdf (document submitted by
Aranz Medical Ltd. describing Silhouette’s intended uses and features).
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patient data from an FDA-regulated device. For example, one app
allows clinicians to use their phones to track patients’ vital signs
remotely, pulling data “from hundreds of different types of patient
monitors.”38 A related app allows obstetricians to monitor patients’
contractions, fetal heartbeats, and other realtime waveform data.39 Yet
another allows cardiologists to review and manipulate ECG results
and histories.40
Perhaps the most well-known of these is Mobile MIM, which allows
physicians to view CT scans, MRIs, PET scans, and other diagnostic
tests on mobile devices.41 Mobile MIM was the first imaging app
cleared by the FDA, in 2011.42 While physicians use Mobile MIM to
diagnose patients, its patient version, VueMe, shares the same
images.43 The apps themselves are free, but the company charges one
dollar each time the user (again, a physician or patient) uploads or
sends an image.44 Mobile MIM was available for download from
iTunes before the FDA had cleared it, but the agency directed the
company to remove it pending regulatory review.45 The company then
38

AirStrip Patient Monitoring, ITUNES PREVIEW, http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/
airstrip-remote-patient-monitoring/id399665195 (last visited June 24, 2013); see also
AirStrip ONE Patient Monitoring, AIRSTRIP TECHS., http://www.airstriptech.com (last
visited June 24, 2013).
39
See AirStrip ONE OB, AIRSTRIP TECHS., http://www.airstriptech.com/airstrip-oneob (last visited June 24, 2013).
40
See The Impact of Airstrip ONE Mobility Across the Cardiology Care Continuum,
AIRSTRIP TECHS., http://www.airstriptech.com/cardiology/pre-hospital (last visited June
24, 2013).
41
See Press Release, MIM Software, Inc., Mobile MIM, First FDA-Cleared
Diagnostic Medical Imaging App, Now Available on the U.S. App Store (Feb. 15,
2011), available at http://www.mimsoftware.com/about/mobilemimpr.
42
See Anne Eisenberg, Those Scan Results Are Just an App Away, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/business/medical-apps-to-assist-withdiagnoses-cleared-by-fda.html; 510(k) Approval Letter from Mary S. Pastel, U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., to Lynn Hanigan, MIM Software, Inc. (Dec. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf11/K112930.pdf; News Release, U.S.
Food & Drug Admin., FDA Clears First Diagnostic Radiology Application for Mobile
Devices (Feb. 4, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/2011/ucm242295.htm. “Clearing” a device is different and less
of an FDA endorsement of its safety and efficacy, than “approving” it through the
Premarket Approval (“PMA”) process. For a critique of the 510(k) process and the
lack of scrutiny FDA gives to many medical devices, see INST. OF MED., MEDICAL
DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 YEARS
(July 29, 2011), available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Medical-Devices-andthe-Publics-Health-The-FDA-510k-Clearance-Process-at-35-Years.aspx.
43
See Eisenberg, supra note 42.
44
See id. (noting the charge is $2 for iPad users).
45
See Vernessa T. Pollard & Chandra Branham, FDA Medical Device Requirements:
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spent two and a half years and roughly $150,000 obtaining the FDA’s
blessing.46 The FDA initially was concerned that physicians would
struggle to make accurate diagnoses while viewing images in bright
environments (particularly outdoors), as opposed to the traditional
approach of viewing images on large dedicated screens in dimly-lit
rooms.47 In response, Mobile MIM developed a feature to
automatically detect subpar lighting conditions.48 The Mobile MIM
story is both a cautionary tale and a success story for app developers.
B. Replicators
A second class of apps turns the smartphone or tablet itself into a
medical device by replicating the functionality of an FDA-regulated
device. For example, several apps use attachments or sensors to send
data directly to the smartphone, which then processes and displays the
results, and perhaps even recommends diagnoses or treatment
options. These apps allow users to connect, for example, to blood
glucose monitors, stethoscopes, or ECG or EEG machines.49 Others
might use the phone’s built-in microphone “to amplify heart, lung,
blood vessel, enteral, and other body sounds.”50 Still others might use
built-in features like accelerometers to measure a patient’s body
movement or heart rate.51 More and more apps are engaging stock
features like lights, vibrations, and cameras for medical uses.52
Within this class, several cardiology apps replicate traditional device
functions and demonstrate the possibilities (and perils) here. For
example, iStethoscope Expert uses the iPhone’s built-in microphone to
record sounds emanating from the heart, lungs, and bowels.53 It
includes a Heart Murmur Interpreter, a Lung Sounds Interpreter, and a
Bowel Sounds Interpreter. The Heart Murmur Interpreter, for
A Legal Framework for Regulating Health Information Technology, Software, and Mobile
Apps, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FOOD AND DRUG LAW, 2011 ED., at *9 (2011),
available at 2011 WL 5833341.
46
See Olga Kharif, Mobile Health Apps Arrive, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 29,
2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/mobile-health-apps-arrive-09292011.
html.
47
See Eisenberg, supra note 42.
48
See id.
49
See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 19 (listing
examples).
50
Id.
51
See id.
52
See id.
53
See iStethoscope Expert, ITUNES PREVIEW, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/
istethoscope-expert-heart/id651962198?mt=8 (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
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example, instructs the user to place the microphone against the chest,
then answer a series of questions like, “Where is the murmur the
loudest on the chest?” “Is the murmur a systolic murmur?” and “Is the
murmur a diasystolic [sic] murmur?” It then generates what it calls a
“diagnosis.” For a test run, selecting the first answer in response to
each of the five questions generates a diagnosis of hypertrophic
cardiomyopathy, which, the app explains, can cause sudden cardiac
death in younger patients during exertion.54
A similar app by AliveCor made waves when videos went viral of a
doctor turning an iPhone into a cardiac event monitor.55 AliveCor uses
a slim iPhone case with two silver electrodes on the outside, which
users hold in their hand or press against the chest. The iPhone’s screen
then displays the familiar peaks and valleys of a heartbeat. The video
proclaims that the app “turns the iPhone 4 into a wireless, clinical
quality cardiac event monitor.”56 The video also claims that the app
can offer “an immediate diagnosis.”57 In 2012, the company was
preparing to submit clinical trial results to the FDA.58
Other cardiac apps rely on more traditional recorders. For example,
in 2011, the FDA cleared the Reka E100 app, which transmits events
recorded by a peripheral cardiac event recording device.59 The app
sends recordings from the event monitor to a monitoring center,
which is then evaluated by a cardiologist. The company’s submission
to the FDA carefully noted that the Reka E100 is not a “conventional
diagnostic tool.”60
Similar apps appear in the diabetes field. The iBGStar Diabetes
Manager app connects iPhones directly to a separate blood glucose
54
For a demonstration, see Nathan Cortez, Medical Apps, Disruptive Innovation,
and Regulatory Timing, AM. SOC’Y OF LAW, MED., & ETHICS (2012), available at
http://prezi.com/arr5dspyjaww/medical-apps-disruptive-innovation-and-regulatorytiming/ (last visited June 24, 2013).
55
See Brian Dolan, iPhone ECG developer AliveCor raises $3 million,
MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Aug. 2, 2011), http://mobihealthnews.com/12224/iphone-ecgdeveloper-alivecor-raises-3-million; AliveCor, Inc., AliveCor — How It All Started —
The Original Dr. Dave iPhone ECG Video, YOUTUBE (May 7, 2013), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=aDnGXzwIJBc (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
56
See AliveCor, Inc., supra note 55.
57
See id.
58
See Timothy Hay, AliveCor Raises $10.5M as Smartphone Heart Monitor Ends
Trials, DOWJONES VENTUREWIRE (June 11, 2012), http://pevc.dowjones.com/Article?an=
DJFVW00020120611e86bawgva&ReturnUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fpevc.dowjones.com%
3A80%2FArticle%3Fan%3DDJFVW00020120611e86bawgva.
59
See REKA Pte. Ltd., 510(k) Summary (FDA Form 510(k)) 2-3 (Sept. 12, 2011),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf11/K111438.pdf.
60
Id. at 2.
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monitoring system.61 Together, the app and the monitor allow patients
to track their blood glucose levels and send results to physicians.62
iBGStar presents data in multiple formats and even alerts users when
their blood sugar levels are too high or too low. An iBGStar meter was
associated with two adverse events reported to the FDA in March
2012, although it was unclear if users were also using the app.63
Some replicator apps are even more ambitious. For example, the
BioZen app claims it can receive realtime feedback from several
biosensor devices, like EEGs, ECGs, electromyographies (“EMGs”),
galvanic skin responses (“GSRs”), respirators, and thermometers.64
BioZen is unique in that it has been endorsed by the U.S. Department
of Defense for improving the mental health of military personnel.65
Notably, the BioZen web-site says, “These devices and BioZen are not
designed or intended for psychological therapy or medical
treatments.”66 Nevertheless, many apps are now trying to replicate the
functions of conventional medical devices.
C. Automators and Customizers
Notwithstanding its disclaimers, BioZen blurs the line between apps
that replicate medical device functions and apps that also use patient
data to generate custom diagnoses or treatment recommendations.
This third category of apps uses questionnaires, algorithms, formulae,
medical calculators, or other software parameters to aid clinical
decisions. As such, these apps are part of a broader universe of clinical

61
See iBGStar Diabetes Manager Application, IBGSTAR, http://www.ibgstar.us/
iphone-app.aspx (last visited June 24, 2013).
62
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 510(K) SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE DETERMINATION,
DECISION SUMMARY 2 (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/
reviews/K103544.pdf; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 510(K) SUMMARY — AGAMATRIX, INC. 2
(Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf10/K103544.pdf.
63
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MAUDE ADVERSE EVENT REPORT: AGAMATRIX,
INC., IBGSTAR BGMS BLOOD GLUCOSE METER (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/detail.cfm?mdrfoi__id=2603027; U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., MAUDE ADVERSE EVENT REPORT: AGAMATRIX, INC., IBGSTAR BGMS BLOOD
GLUCOSE METER (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/
cfmaude/detail.cfm?mdrfoi__id=2577874.
64
See BioZen, NAT’L CTR. FOR TELEHEALTH & TECH., http://www.t2health.org/apps/
biozen (last visited June 24, 2013).
65
See id.
66
BioZen, GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.t2&hl=en
(last visited Feb. 3, 2014). The FDA says that it plans to address apps that analyze,
process, or interpret data from multiple medical devices in a separate guidance. FDA
DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 15.
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decision support software.67 The apps can, for example, automate tasks
for physicians, such as calculating an Apgar Score for newborns, or
determining the precise dose of blood thinner, anesthesia, or
chemotherapy for patients based on their age, weight, and other
inputs.68 As noted above, iStethoscope Expert features this
functionality via its questionnaire, demonstrating how the categorical
lines blur. Another example is Depression Journal, an iPhone app that
allows users to track when they are depressed and identify potential
triggers.69 It once claimed that the app is “a valuable tool for
Depression Trends Analysis to get additional insights about triggers
and how to avoid them.”70
A related species of apps that may hold the most promise of
decentralizing and demystifying medicine is the all-in-one diagnostic
tool, like Pocket Doctor, Caracal Diagnosis, Diagnosis Pro, and
WebMD’s Symptom Checker. These apps are proliferating. A search
for “diagnosis” in the App Store generates 275 iPad apps and 509
iPhone apps.71 These programs typically allow users to key in
symptoms and even laboratory values, which feed into an algorithm
that generates potential diagnoses, usually ordered by probability. For
example, entering “chest pain” and “lightheadedness” into Caracal
generates 119 possible diagnoses and 15 “high probabilities.” Caracal
differentiates high-probability from low-probability diagnoses by color
(red to green).
Many apps simultaneously promise great things and then disclaim
their accuracy, urging users to seek advice from medical
professionals.72 Notably, many customizer apps generally target
67
Clinical decision support software is drawing increased attention from scholars.
See, e.g., Amanda Swanson & Fazal Khan, The Legal Challenge of Incorporating
Artificial Intelligence into Medical Practice, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 90 (2012)
(discussing how health providers have increasingly turned to such technology as it has
become more affordable and reliable).
68
See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 19-20.
69
See Depression Journal, IHEALTH VENTURES, http://www.ihealthventures.com/
app_details.php?aid=34824 (last visited June 24, 2013).
70
Id. (note that the description has since changed).
71
Search conducted on January 26, 2014.
72
For example, the Caracal app disclaims that: “Caracal is a clinical decision
support system. It cannot guarantee the accuracy of the diagnoses and please note that
you are solely responsible for any decisions you take based on the information
contained in it.” Husam Salhab, Caracal Diagnosis: Smart Medical Diseases Search
Engine, ITUNES PREVIEW, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/caracal-diagnosis-smartmedical/id529633939?mt=8 (accessed on Aug. 9, 2013) (note that as of December 9,
2013, the disclaimer was updated to read, “Please note that Caracal is only a
differential diagnosis tool and isn’t supposed to give you any further information
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medical professionals and students, though nothing prevents lay users
from downloading them. Like other medical innovations, the message
is often “caveat emptor.”73 Yet, these all-in-one tools may represent the
primordial beginnings of the Tricorder.
D. Informers and Educators
A broad fourth category includes medical reference texts and
educational apps that primarily aim to inform and educate. For
example, hundreds of apps replicate medical textbooks, references, or
teaching aids. Trusted sources like the Physician’s Desk Reference, the
Merck Manual, and Gray’s Anatomy have been converted into app
format.74 Many medical journals now present themselves in app format
as well, including the New England Journal of Medicine (“NEJM”),
the Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”), the
Journal of Clinical Oncology, and The Lancet.75 As a godsend to
medical students, hundreds of apps replicate flash cards, quizzes, and
other exam review materials, enhanced by touch controls and other
interactive features on modern smartphones and tablets.76

regarding medical conditions”). Similarly, the Pocket Doctor app disclaims, “Pocket
Doctor cannot guarantee the accuracy of the diagnoses. You use it at your own risk.”
Pocket App Ltd., Pocket Doctor Lite, ITUNES PREVIEW, https://itunes.apple.com/
us/app/pocket-doctor-lite/id520802051?mt=8 (accessed on Aug. 9, 2013) (note that
the description has since changed).
73
See Nathan Cortez, Recalibrating the Legal Risks of Cross-Border Health Care, 10
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 18-19 (2010).
74
See AP Tech. Holdings, LLC, The Merck Manual Professional Edition, ITUNES
PREVIEW, http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/merck-manual-professional/id331016312 (last
visited June 24, 2013); Elsevier Inc., Gray’s Anatomy for Students for iPad, ITUNES
PREVIEW, http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/grays-anatomy-for-students/id429405125 (last
visited June 24, 2013); Skyscape, mobilePDR for Prescribers, ITUNES PREVIEW,
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/mobilepdr-for-prescribers/id382594350 (last visited June
24, 2013).
75
See About NEJM Mobile, NEW ENG. J. MED., http://www.nejm.org/page/aboutnejm/mobile-applications (last visited Feb. 8, 2014); About the Lancet iPad Application,
LANCET, http://www.thelancet.com/ipad (last visited June 24, 2013); HighWire Press
& Stanford University, The Journal of Clinical Oncology, ITUNES PREVIEW,
https://itunes.apple.com/gb/app/journal-of-clinical-oncology/id465016976?mt=8 (last
visited June 24, 2013); The JAMA Network, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://mobile.
jamanetwork.com/ (last visited June 24, 2013) (linking to JAMA’s app, which features
the Journal and nine specialty journals).
76
See, e.g., Elsevier Inc., Netter’s Anatomy Atlas Free, ITUNES PREVIEW,
http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/netters-anatomy-atlas-free/id457575880 (last visited
June 24, 2013) (providing an example of an application that has quizzing and
customization features).
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These apps largely represent digital versions of print sources  or
sources that otherwise might have been printed in bygone eras. They
do not concern the FDA or other regulators much, as their print
counterparts would fall outside of FDA jurisdiction.77 Still, informer
and educator apps are worth noting, as they seem to comprise a robust
portion of the reported 97,000 mobile health apps on the market in
2013.78
E. Administrators
Other, more mundane apps automate office functions, like
identifying appropriate insurance billing codes or scheduling patient
appointments.79 These represent the mobile evolution of practice
management software. Such apps are “medical” insofar as they are
used by medical providers, not because they perform any medical
functions per se. Yet, at some point these apps might become more
ambitious. For example, a scheduling app logically might administer
pre-appointment patient questionnaires, then flag certain patients for
specific diagnostic tests based on their answers. Such a feature would
bring administrative apps closer to clinical decision support software,
which I categorize above as automators or customizers. Again, these
categories will be transient for apps that evolve.
F.

Loggers and Trackers

A final, more interesting cluster of apps allows users to log, record,
and make decisions about their general health and wellness. This
group includes diet trackers, calorie counters, exercise regimens, and
the like. They may integrate alarms, timers, reminders, and other
interactive features. Others try to “gamify” health care by using gamelike rewards systems, point-tracking, and challenges to encourage
healthier behavior.80 These apps represent another innovative frontier
77

See FDA DRAFT SOFTWARE POLICY, supra note 22, at *1.
See RESEARCH2GUIDANCE, Report 2013–2017, supra note 31, at 7.
79
For example, a search conducted on December 29, 2013 for “ICD” in the App
Store (short for International Classification of Diseases, the World Health
Organization’s coding system commonly used by insurers) generates 135 iPad apps
and 194 iPhone apps.
80
In fact, there is a new academic journal dedicated to studying the “gamification”
of health care, the Games for Health Journal. See Brian Edwards, Gamification of
Healthcare Gets Its Due Recognition from Academic Elite, IMEDICALAPPS (Aug. 19, 2011),
http://www.imedicalapps.com/2011/08/gamification-healthcare-due-recognitionacademic-elite/; Games for Health Journal, LIEBERT OPEN ACCESS, http://online.
liebertpub.com/loi/G4H (last visited June 24, 2013).
78
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for health care, even though they generally do not concern the FDA 
as long as they do not try to diagnose, cure, treat, mitigate, or prevent
specific, identifiable diseases or conditions.81
But herein lays the gray area. Many health and wellness apps do
address themselves to specific diseases or conditions. An important
subset of these includes apps offered by FDA-regulated firms, like
pharmaceutical, biotech, and medical device companies.82 Loggers and
trackers may also automate knowledge contained in medical literature
and clinical studies to educate users and guide their decisions. The
FDA notes that such apps could meet the statutory definition of
medical “devices,” but intends to monitor these apps without
regulating them at the moment.83 European regulators are also
debating whether pharmaceutical apps qualify as medical devices
under EU law.84 In both jurisdictions, such apps are proliferating.
***
A final observation worth emphasizing is that any taxonomy of
mobile health technologies will be suggestive rather than definitive.
Apps that today inform and educate may add logging or tracking
features. Loggers and trackers may evolve into customizers,
replicators, or connectors. These apps are subject to frequent updates.
Indeed, part of the appeal of software is that it is easy to change. But it
also marks a significant departure from more traditional medical
devices.
II.

THE PROMISE OF MOBILE HEALTH

These first-generation apps should evolve into more sophisticated,
capable iterations that might change how we deliver, consume,

81

See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 11.
For example, the website Pocket.MD tracks mobile apps offered by
pharmaceutical, biotech, and medical device companies. As of January 2014, it counts
at least 1,378 such apps, including those offered by Amgen, Medtronic, Pfizer, and
other industry leaders. All Apps, POCKET.MD, http://www.pocket.md/applications.html
(last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
83
See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 11-12 &
n.13.
84
See, e.g., James Sherwin-Smith & Rowan Pritchard-Jones, Medical Applications:
The Future of Regulation, 94 BULL. OF ROYAL COLL. OF SURGEONS OF ENG. 12 (2012)
(considering the legal status of medical apps under the European Union Medical
Devices Directive).
82
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measure, and pay for health care. As the mobile health market begins
to mature, it is worth pausing to evaluate these possibilities.
As an initial matter, both the trajectory of mobile health users and
the value of the market are impressive. For example, the number of
medical apps created for Apple devices more than doubled in just one
year, jumping from roughly 800 in 2010 to 2,000 in 2011  not even
counting apps for other platforms, like Android and Blackberry.85 The
number of people accessing health data on their phones increased
125% between 2010 and 2012, to roughly 17 million.86 The number of
users that downloaded mobile health apps nearly doubled in just one
year, from 124 million in 2011 to 247 million in 2012.87 By 2015,
industry observers predict that 500 million smartphone users will use
mobile health apps.88
The value of the medical app market has risen correspondingly,
from $718 million in 2011 to an estimated $1.3 billion in 2012.89 The
broader mobile health industry may be worth anywhere from $2
billion to $6 billion by 2015.90 Another estimate predicts that by 2018,
the market will generate $26 billion in revenues.91
On a broader scale, there has been a rapid diffusion of smartphones,
tablets, and other mobile devices, which seems to be accelerating
rather than abating. By 2018, there may be 3.4 billion unique
smartphones and tablets capable of downloading mobile health apps,
about half of which are predicted to do so.92 Today, more people
worldwide have access to mobile phone service (5.7 billion) than to

85
See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Public Workshop — Mobile Medical
Applications Draft Guidance, Transcript (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter FDA Public
Workshop], http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/
ucm267821.htm (statement by Brian Dolan of MobiHealth News).
86
See FCC, COMM’N DOC., CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL TO SPUR INNOVATION IN MEDICAL
BODY AREA NETWORKS 2 (May 17, 2012) [hereinafter CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL],
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-314146A1.pdf.
87
See Ralf-Gordon Jahns, U.S. $1.3 Billion: The Market for mHealth Applications in
2012, RESEARCH2GUIDANCE (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.research2guidance.com/.
88
See Orr, supra note 14, at 2.
89
See Jahns, supra note 87.
90
See FCC, CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL, supra note 86, at 2 (citing Healthcare
Information and Management Systems Society).
91
See RESEARCH2GUIDANCE, Report 2013–2017, supra note 31, at 7. In 2011, a
London-based research company predicted that the market would generate $11.8
billion in revenues by 2018. Brian Dolan, Global Mobile Health Market Now Worth
$11.8B by 2018, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Aug. 6, 2012), http://mobihealthnews.com/18159/
global-mobile-health-market-now-worth-11-8b-by-2018/.
92
See RESEARCH2GUIDANCE, Report 2013–2017, supra note 31, at 7.
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basic sanitation (4.4 billion).93 Mobile phones are creating new
possibilities in developing countries in particular for mobile banking
and mobile health.94
If we are truly on the cusp of a mobile health revolution, several
groups are trying to accelerate it. In 2011, the X Prize Foundation and
Qualcomm announced a $10 million prize for the first group to create
a real-life Tricorder  the futuristic, all-purpose, handheld medical
diagnostic tool used by Dr. McCoy in Star Trek.95 According to the
contest guidelines, the winning device must “allow a user to diagnose
themselves without having to visit a doctor or hospital.”96 The
guidelines encapsulate the aspirations for mobile health, which is
nothing short of “major disruption to global health care systems.”97
The following sections evaluate the three major ambitions of mobile
health: to improve the quality of health care and reduce medical
errors; to reduce the cost of health care; and to increase access to care
by democratizing and demystifying medicine.
A. Improve Quality
A primary aspiration of mobile health is to reduce medical errors,
improve quality care, and save lives. One idea is that mobile
monitoring will allow us to gather more granular health data on
patients, and in shorter, more frequent intervals. Patients and
93

See FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85 (statement of Robert Jarrin,
Qualcomm, Inc.).
94
See, e.g., Marc J. Epstein & Eric G. Bing, Delivering Health Care to the Global
Poor: Solving the Accessibility Problem, 6 INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE,
GLOBALIZATION 117 (2011) (discussing how technology, including the use of mobile
phones, has revolutionized health care in the developing world); James G. Kahn,
Joshua S. Yang & James S. Kahn, ‘Mobile’ Health Needs and Opportunities in Developing
Countries, 29 HEALTH AFF. 254 (2010) (analyzing various mhealth applications in
developing countries at the large geographic area level, community level, and
individual level); Terje Aksel Sanner, Lars Kristian Roland & Kristin Braa, From Pilot
to Scale: Towards an mHealth Typology for Low-Resource Contexts, 1 HEALTH POL’Y &
TECH. 155 (2012) (providing an analysis of the use of mobile phones in the Health
Information System in low-resource settings); Symposium, Mobile Money in Developing
Countries: Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 155
(2013) (presenting articles about the use of mobile phones in developing countries for
banking and the creation of financial institutions).
95
See Bosch, supra note 16.
96
See id. (citing tweet by Dr. Peter Diamandis, Chairman and CEO of X Prize
Foundation). Final guidelines for this competition were published in September 2012,
but have been updated in 2013. See generally Competition Guidelines, supra note 16
(containing the full details about the Competition).
97
Competition Guidelines, supra note 16, at 61.
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providers can then use this data to better tailor care, to better
coordinate care, and to avoid duplicative or unnecessary care. For
example, hospitals can use networked devices to monitor inpatients or
even discharged patients, particularly those managing chronic
conditions.98 Mobile technologies might then process this data to alert
patients and physicians of sudden (or even gradual) changes for the
worse. Constant monitoring might give providers more lead-time to
respond to life-threatening conditions, or even predict them ahead of
time, and could reduce hospital readmission rates.99
The intuitive appeal of mobile technologies is that they might
leverage massive amounts of clinical research data and experience,
embodying the ideals of empirical, “evidence-based medicine.”100 Datadriven technologies could help physicians and hospitals better
coordinate care, and empower patients to better manage their own
health, particularly chronic conditions. Medical apps could, in theory,
improve the quality of all types of care  preventative and primary,
acute and tertiary.
Yet, despite the ambition to reduce medical errors and improve
quality, a recent study found that many medical apps “do not follow
established medical guidelines.”101 For example, a 2011 study of fortyseven different smoking cessation apps found that they followed very
few of the evidence-based clinical practice guidelines for smoking
cessation programs, like combining pharmacotherapy and
counseling.102 A review of 137 diabetes apps found “obvious gaps
between
the
evidence-based
recommendations
and
the
98
For a description of the possibilities with Medical Body Area Networks
(MBANs), see FCC, CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL, supra note 86.
99
See id. at 1.
100
“Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is the process of basing clinical
decisionmaking on the best available objective and unbiased medical research, which
generally means information gained from randomized controlled clinical trials or
systematic reviews of data from multiple trials.” Swanson & Khan, supra note 67, at
110; see also Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Healthcare
Reform: An Update, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 21, 21 (2012). For a historical evaluation of
the ambitions of evidence-based medicine and clinical practice guidelines, as related to
legal battles over physician standards of care, including its recent resurgence, see
Maxwell J. Mehlman, Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 44 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1165 (2012).
101
Rochelle Sharpe, Lacking Regulation, Many Medical Apps Questionable at Best,
NEW ENG. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Nov. 18, 2012), http://necir-bu.org/
investigations/medical-apps/.
102
See Lorien C. Aroms et al., iPhone Apps for Smoking Cessation: A Content
Analysis, 40 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 279, 279-85 (2011), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3395318/.
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functionality . . . found in online markets.”103 In fact, various reviews
find that many mobile health apps either ignore or contradict
evidence-based guidelines, are not supported by scientific research, or
are not even developed with the input of a medical professional.104
A Boston University study examined 1,500 mobile health apps, and
found that over 20% (331) “claim[] to treat or cure medical
problems.”105 Almost half of these rely on a smartphone’s stock
features (like lights, sound, or vibration) to produce a therapeutic
effect.106 Yet, the study found a near consensus among scientific and
medical experts that smartphones cannot deliver lights or sounds in
therapeutic doses, particularly for the conditions being targeted.107 For
example, the iSAD app claims to treat seasonal affective disorder
(“SAD”) and depression, instructing customers to use the app for 15
to 45 minutes each day with the iPhone screen adjusted for maximum
brightness.108 But the iPhone emits a maximum of only 200 lux, while
light therapy to treat SAD requires ten times that amount (2,000 lux)
during a two-hour session.109 The app is careful to disclaim, “The iSAD
Lamp is meant for entertainment purposes.”110
Similarly, the Boston University study found that sound therapy
apps have very little scientific or medical research to support their
claims.111 For example, the A.G.Method app, which sells for $9.99,

103
Taridzo Chomutare et al., Features of Mobile Diabetes Applications: Review of the
Literature and Analysis of Current Applications Compared Against Evidence-Based
Guidelines, 13 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 65 (2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMC3222161/.
104
See, e.g., Pamela Lewis Dolan, What’s Missing from Many Health Apps — Medical
Expertise, AM. MED. NEWS (May 13, 2013), http://www.amednews.com/article/
20130513/business/130519995/6/ (citing an unpublished study of 222 pain-related
smartphone apps); Benjamin A. Rosser & Christopher Eccleston, Smartphone
Applications for Pain Management, 17 J. TELEMEDICINE & TELECARE 308 (2011),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21844177 (examining 111 painrelated apps on five major platforms); Sharpe, supra note 101 (studying 1,500 paid
apps).
105
Sharpe, supra note 101. The Center investigated “apps that cost money and
have been available since June 2011.” The Center found a range of prices between “69
cents to $999.”
106
See id.
107
See id.
108
See id.; Comtek, iSAD Lamp, ITUNES PREVIEW, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/
isad-lamp/id389744890?mt=8 (last visited June 18, 2013).
109
See Sharpe, supra note 101 (citing two leading researchers on seasonal affective
disorder, including the pioneer of light therapy).
110
Id.; Comtek, supra note 108.
111
See Sharpe, supra note 101.
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claims to use “sonic induction” to treat pain.112 In the company’s
words: “This Application helps you to quickly and easily relieve
everyday pain such as insomnia, headache, toothache, minor muscle
aches and other general pains. A.G.Method App has been completely
tested and verified as safe, efficacious, and effective.”113 Again, experts
reacted with deep skepticism about these claims. In one reviewer’s
opinion: “There is no plausible, physiologic way in which something
like this would help.”114
Thus, in these early, evolutionary phases of mobile health, some
aspire to harness evidence-based medicine to enable higher quality,
better tailored, and better coordinated care, with fewer mistakes. But
at the other end of the spectrum, many apps are the equivalent of
“digital snake oil.”115 The problem is that consumers (both patients
and professionals alike) may have trouble distinguishing the two.116
B. Reduce Spending
A second aspiration for mobile health is to reduce our profligate
spending. A recurrent theme in the writing on mobile health  be it
academic, business, government, media, or medical  is that mobile
technologies can economize in a number of ways, typically by
preventing more acute, expensive episodes of care. For example,
mobile technologies could reduce the number of hospital visits,
physician visits, and other expensive face-to-face consultations.117
Mobile apps might also enable us to better manage chronic diseases,
which account for roughly 75% of all U.S. health spending.118

112

A.G. Method, AGMethod, ITUNES PREVIEW, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/
agmethod/id422329655?mt=8 (last visited June 18, 2013); see Sharpe, supra note 101.
113
A.G. Method, supra note 112.
114
Sharpe, supra note 101 (quoting Satish Misra, physician and managing editor of
the website iMedicalApps).
115
Carl Franzen, Side Effects May Vary: The Growing Problem of Unregulated
Medical Apps, VERGE (June 3, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/3/
4380244/how-should-medical-apps-be-regulated.
116
See Lex van Velsen et al., Why Mobile Health App Overload Drives Us Crazy, and
How to Restore the Sanity, 13 BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION MAKING 23 (2013),
available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/13/23.
117
See FCC, COMM’N DOC., CHAIRMAN GENACHOWSKI HOSTS MHEALTH SUMMIT 3
(June 6, 2012) [hereinafter CHAIRMAN GENACHOWSKI], http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-314487A1.pdf.
118
See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CHRONIC DISEASES: THE POWER TO
PREVENT, THE CALL TO CONTROL (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/resources/
publications/aag/chronic.htm.
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Several estimates predict concrete savings through mobile health.
For example, one estimate predicts that using disposable wireless
sensors to detect hospital-acquired infections early could save up to
$12,000 per patient, or $11 billion per year.119 Another calculates $10
billion in annual savings from using mobile technologies to remotely
monitor patients with congestive heart failure.120 And a 2008 study
suggested that using mobile technologies to monitor just four
common chronic conditions could save us $197 billion over twentyfive years.121 Studies even predict that mobile technologies can help
cut our health care system’s considerable administrative costs.122
The vast majority of medical apps are either free or very inexpensive
(in the one to five dollar range). And anything that shifts the locus of
care away from expensive professionals, facilities, and insurance
systems could save us significant money. Although we have long
suspected that indiscriminately adopting new technologies (many with
marginal benefits over the old) contributes to higher health care
spending,123 mobile health could buck this trend.
Policymakers have also been quick to jump on the cost-saving
bandwagon. For example, FCC chairman Julius Genachowski has
made repeated public remarks that mobile technologies can save
billions in health care spending.124 Members of Congress repeat this
refrain, noting blithely that “[i]nnovative wireless medical devices play

119

See FCC, CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL, supra note 86, at 2.
See id.
121
See Robert E. Litan, Vital Signs via Broadband: Remote Health Monitoring
Transmits Savings, Enhances Lives, BETTER HEALTH CARE TOGETHER 1, 2 (Oct. 24, 2008),
http://www.corp.att.com/healthcare/docs/litan.pdf.
122
See, e.g., Connected Life: The Impact of the Connected Life over the Next Five Years,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 1, 7-8 (2013), http://www.gsma.com/connectedliving/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/GSMA-Connected-Life-PwC_Feb-2013.pdf (predicting that
mHealth might cut health spending in OECD nations by $400 billion in 2017,
including 20-30% savings in hospital administrative expenses); The Socio-Economic
Impact of Mobile Health, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP 7 (2012), http://www.telenor.
com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/BCG-Telenor-Mobile-Health-Report-May-2012.pdf
(predicting administrative savings of 20-30%). In fact, a recent bill proposed in
Congress would push federal health care programs to examine how wireless health
information technologies could save on federal program expenses. H.R. 3577, 113th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
123
For an account almost twenty years ago, see Alan M. Garber, Can Technology
Assessment Control Health Spending?, 13 HEALTH AFF. 115 (1994).
124
See FCC, CHAIRMAN GENACHOWSKI, supra note 117; FCC, CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL
supra note 86, at 1.
120
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a vital role in addressing our nation’s unsustainable health care
costs.”125
Of course, for all this to be true, these technologies must work.
Apps of the “digital snake oil” variety126 will squander rather than save
money. The likely outcome is that some mobile technologies will
economize while others either have no affect or even raise spending.
The question, then, is what net economic effect mobile health care will
have on overall spending.
C. Democratize Medicine
A third, related aspiration for mobile health is to decentralize,
demystify, and democratize medicine. Many mobile health
technologies allow patients to closely monitor their own health, which
should increase patient engagement. Patients thus equipped might be
less reliant on the bottleneck of information and advice generated by
medical professionals, facilities, and even payors. Mobile health
aspires to shift the locus of care away from these more established,
expensive institutions, and towards individual patients. Indeed,
decentralizing and democratizing access to health information and
self-diagnostic tools is a core theme of the “disruption” literature,
which sees medical apps and other health information technologies
fundamentally transforming health care in the near future.127
When viewed more broadly, mobile health is part of broader
cultural and technological evolutions, including the march towards
more personalized medicine,128 the “quantified self” movement,129 the
125
Letter from Representatives Marsha Blackburn et al., to Margaret Hamburg,
FDA Comm’r, and Julius Genachowski, FCC Chairman (Apr. 3, 2012), available at
http://blackburn.house.gov/uploadedfiles/letter_from_congress_to_fda_and_fcc_-_
3apr2012.pdf.
126
See Franzen, supra note 115. See generally Nathan Cortez, The FDA Needs to
Regulate “Digital Snake Oil,” SLATE (Sept. 24, 2013, 3:59 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/future_tense/2013/09/24/mhealth_fda_needs_to_regulate_digital_snake_oil.html
(discussing what the FDA has done to regulate health apps, and what it must do in the
future to encourage high quality innovation).
127
See, e.g., CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, JEROME H. GROSSMAN & JASON HWANG, THE
INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION: A DISRUPTIVE SOLUTION FOR HEALTH CARE 313-20 (2009)
(describing alternating waves of decentralization and centralization in the medical
device and diagnostic industry). But see Terry, supra note 28, at 733-35 (explaining
why health information technologies have yet to achieve such disruption).
128
For a description of the futuristic ambitions of personalized medicine and
related trends, see Melanie Swan, Health 2050: The Realization of Personalized Medicine
through Crowdsourcing, the Quantified Self, and the Participatory Biocitizen, 2 J.
PERSONALIZED MED. 93 (2012).
129
The “quantified self” movement, founded by two Wired magazine editors, seeks
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“lifelogging” phenomenon,130 and the rising era of “big data.”131 These
trends converge in mobile health. Mobile apps that allow consumers
to collect more granular health data about themselves, and in more
frequent intervals, might lead to better-tailored diagnoses and
treatments. This data collection effort is made possible through
wearable sensors, ingestible diagnostic devices,132 and advances in
bioinformatics that inspired, in part, the “quantified self” and
“lifelogging” phenomena. And the “big data” era promises to use
advances in large-scale data crunching to engage this flood of data in
more and more surprising ways.133 A byproduct of these phenomena is
the “deskilling” of medicine  demystifying medical practice that for
decades has been based on idiosyncratic professional judgments and
intuitions rather than hard data and evidence-based medicine.134 To
to use various technologies, including biometric sensors and wearable devices, to
collect data about ourselves and our health. It is also known as “self tracking,” “body
hacking,” and by other labels. For popular descriptions, see Kashmir Hill, Adventures
in Self-Surveillance, a.k.a. The Quantified Self, a.k.a. Extreme Naval-Gazing, FORBES
(Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/04/07/adventures-inself-surveillance-aka-the-quantified-self-aka-extreme-navel-gazing/; The Quantified
Self: Counting Every Moment, ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.economist.com/
node/21548493.
130
“Lifelogging,” closely related to the “quantified self” movement, is the practice
of using computing technologies to comprehensively archive one’s existence,
including but not necessarily involving one’s health. See Anita L. Allen, Dredging Up
the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 48-49 (2008).
131
“Big data” refers collectively to the practice of collecting, analyzing, and using
large quantities of information. See Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The
Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 682, 683 n.1 (2013). For a
dystopian, fictional glimpse of what our quantified futures might look like, see GARY
SHTEYNGART, SUPER SAD TRUE LOVE STORY (2010).
132
For example, several companies are developing “smart pill” technology, which
allows patients to digest pills that transmit diagnostic data wirelessly, outside the
body. In 2012, the FDA cleared for marketing an “ingestible event marker” by Proteus
Biomedical, Inc., which can help track whether patients are adhering to their
medication regimen. See Letter from Jonette Foy, Deputy Director for Science and
Regulatory Policy, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, to Jafar Shenasa, Senior
Manager, Proteus Biomedical, Inc. (July 20, 2012), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
cdrh_docs/pdf11/K113070.pdf. In 2013, the FDA proposed relaxing market clearance
requirements for ingestible monitoring devices. See Medical Devices; General Hospital
and Personal Use Monitoring Devices; Classification of the Ingestible Event Marker,
78 Fed. Reg. 28,733 (May 16, 2013) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 880.6305) (classifying
such devices as Class II and categorizing them as “ingestible event markers”).
133
See generally Pasquale, supra note 131 (arguing for a “grand bargain” between
providers, administrative agencies, and patients to allow full access to data while
attempting to protect personal information).
134
For a short discussion of the pros and cons, see Stefan Timmermans & Aaron
Mauck, The Promises and Pitfalls of Evidence-Based Medicine, 24 HEALTH AFF. 18, 20-21
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advocates, mobile health provides a logical, efficient vehicle for
achieving these ideals.135
Still, other innovations have fallen short of similar promises, such as
the consumer-driven health care movement,136 and (so far) the
electronic medical record, as embodied in the well-documented
failures of Google Health, and before it, Healtheon.137 But some
substrata of mobile health technologies, like telemedicine, have
already made care more accessible in rural and other underserved
areas.138 And given the trajectory of mobile phone users and health
apps, this technology might succeed where its predecessors failed.
***
Improving health care quality, lowering costs, and increasing access
has long been the Holy Trinity of health care  a triad that has eluded
U.S. policymakers for decades.139 It would be extraordinary if
smartphones and tablet computers could accomplish what federal and
state policymakers have not. Is mobile health too good to be true? As
desperate as the U.S. health care system is for genuine transformation,

(2005).
135
See, e.g., ERIC TOPOL, THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF MEDICINE: HOW THE DIGITAL
REVOLUTION WILL CREATE BETTER HEALTH CARE (2012) (discussing how the digital
revolution will improve health care).
136
For a devastating critique of consumer-driven health insurance, see TIMOTHY
STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT
(2007).
137
See Terry, supra note 28, at 724-25. For the story of Healtheon, the precursor to
ventures like Google Health, see MICHAEL LEWIS, THE NEW NEW THING: A SILICON
VALLEY STORY (1999).
138
See FCC, CHAIRMAN GENACHOWSKI, supra note 117, at 2 (announcing the FCC
Rural Health Care Pilot). For an excellent treatment of the legal and policy issues
surrounding telemedicine, see Thomas R. McLean, The Offshoring of American
Medicine: Scope, Economic Issues and Legal Liabilities, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 205
(2005); see also Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Teleradiology: A Case Study
of the Economic and Legal Considerations in International Trade in Telemedicine, 25
HEALTH AFF. 1378, 1379-81 (2006).
139
See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, The Elusive Ideal of Market Competition in United States’
Health Care, in HEALTH CARE AND EU LAW 359 (J.W. van de Gronden et al. eds., 2011)
(arguing that the implementation of market-based techniques in the United States
have failed to lower cost, increase quality, or increase access); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost,
Why Can’t We Do What They Do? National Health Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 433 (2004) [hereinafter Why Can’t We Do What They Do?] (citing U.S. political
institutions, U.S. social culture, the political power of providers, and the strength of
path dependency as forces preventing healthcare reform).
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many hope that mobile technologies can be the panacea.140 We cling to
the notion that we can innovate our way to a better health care system,
even though decades of innovation have not produced better
outcomes or more efficiency relative to our peer countries.141 There are
valid reasons for excitement. But there are equally valid reasons for
healthy skepticism. The last quarter-century demonstrates that
medical software quickly evolves to become more ubiquitous and
more critical to patient safety. Given the wide range of outcomes here
 including the possibility of core transformations to health care
delivery, consumption, and financing  how are policymakers
responding?
III. THE GOVERNMENT’S POSTURE
The revolutionary potential of mobile health has not gone
unnoticed. Mobile health is on the radars of Congress and over half a
dozen federal agencies, including the FDA, FCC, and FTC. In Part III,
I demonstrate that contrary to prevailing sentiment, Congress and
federal regulators are facilitating rather than stifling mobile health
technologies. I argue that this posture is admirable, so long as it does
not preclude meaningful oversight.
A. The Food and Drug Administration
The FDA has clear jurisdiction to regulate most of the mobile health
technologies described above, though it is unclear how prepared the
agency is. To understand the FDA’s approach to mobile health, and
why mobile health will test the agency, one must first understand FDA
jurisdiction.
The FDA has always been burdened by its steadily expanding
dominion. Every year, more companies introduce more products that
fit within the FDA’s jurisdiction under the federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.142 The Act grants the FDA jurisdiction over medical
“devices,” which it defines very broadly as any product intended to
140

See Terry, supra note 28, at 723-24.
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An
Essay on Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537, 547-48 (2006); Jost,
Why Can’t We Do What They Do?, supra note 139, at 436.
142
See David C. Vladeck, The FDA and Deference Lost: A Self-Inflicted Wound or the
Product of a Wounded Agency? A Response to Professor O’Reilly, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 981,
983, 998-99 (2008). See generally Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No.
75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (2012))
(giving the FDA the authority to oversee the safety of food, drugs, and cosmetics).
141
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diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease, or any product
intended to affect the structure or function of the body (and that is not
a drug).143 As Part I demonstrates, many mobile health technologies
intend to perform one or more of these functions.
“Intended use” is a key element in defining “devices,” and thus in
defining the outer bounds of FDA jurisdiction. The agency, by
regulation, has defined “intended use” as the objective intent of how
those responsible for marketing the product intend it to be used.144
The agency can determine objective intent by looking at the product
itself, at the manufacturer’s claims about it, and at other oral and
written statements by those marketing it.145 Moreover, the FDA can
consider the “circumstances surrounding distribution of the article,”
including widespread consumer use.146 Again, the typology of mobile
health technologies in Part I demonstrates that the FDA has clear
jurisdiction over most of these products.
Thus, FDA jurisdiction depends in large part on a product’s
intended functionality. As a result, FDA-regulated devices range from
toothbrushes and Band-Aids to pacemakers and MRI machines.147
Because devices are so numerous and varied, Congress and the FDA
have prioritized which devices deserve more regulatory attention
based on the risks they present. A mobile application thus might
qualify as a Class I device (low risk), a Class II device (moderate risk),
or a Class III device (high risk).148 The higher the classification, the
more scrutiny the device receives. For example, to get to the market,

143
See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012) (defining “device” as “an instrument, apparatus,
implement, machine, contrivance . . . or other similar or related article, including any
component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of
disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, in man or other animals, or . . . intended to affect the structure or any
function of the body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve its primary
intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other
animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of
its primary intended purposes”). The FDA considers device accessories to be finished
devices themselves. See 21 C.F.R. § 820.3(l) (2013).
144
See 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (2013).
145
See id.
146
Id. Note, however, that FDA officials testified to Congress that the agency will not
use actual use to determine “intended use.” See Letter from Michele Mital, Acting Associate
Commissioner for Legislation, to Hon. Tim Murphy, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives 2 (Mar. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Mital Letter], available at http://
www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/HousemHealthLetter.pdf.
147
See Pollard & Branham, supra note 45, at *3.
148
See 21 U.S.C. § 360(c) (2012).
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Class III devices generally must undergo premarket approval by the
FDA,149 which typically requires clinical trials. In contrast, Class II
devices must provide relatively cursory premarket notification, known
as a 510(k) notice,150 which the FDA generally accepts. Finally, most
of the lowest-risk Class I devices typically require no premarket
notification at all.151 Thus, the FDA will impose very different
gatekeeping requirements on mobile health products depending on
the risks each one poses.
The problem with device software in general, and mobile health
apps in particular, is that they evolve quickly and frequently. FDA
device classifications are not nearly as fluid as software products,
particularly this latest generation of software apps. Like many new
technologies, medical apps can complicate existing regulatory
frameworks.152
The FDA addressed these ambiguities in July 2011, when it
published a Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Applications,
announcing a 90-day public comment period.153 The Draft Guidance
followed months of speculation about how the FDA might confront
medical apps. Indeed, days before the FDA published it, an industry
coalition proposed its own competing framework.154 And, months
earlier, the FDA issued a joint statement with the FCC explaining that
the agencies wanted to facilitate wireless medical technologies.155
The FDA finalized the guidance just two years later, in September
2013156 (a quick turnaround by FDA standards, but an eternity by
Silicon Valley standards). The guidance enunciates a tentative
approach to medical apps, including the types of apps that it might
149

See 21 C.F.R. pt. 814.1 (2013).
See 21 U.S.C. § 360(k); 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(2) (2013).
151
See 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1).
152
See generally Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing the FDA’s long struggle to regulate
innovative medical software).
153
See Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff, supra
note 24, at 43,689; FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 1.
154
For example, in December 2010, attorneys for the mHealth Regulatory
Coalition, an industry group, published a white paper on FDA’s potential approach to
mobile medical apps. See Bradley Merrill Thompson et al., A Call for Clarity: Open
Questions on the Scope of FDA Regulation of mHealth, MHEALTH REGULATORY COALITION,
at i (Dec. 22, 2010), http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/
12/mrcwhitefinal122210.pdf.
155
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. & FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, JOINT STATEMENT ON
WIRELESS MED. DEVICES 1 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter FDA & FCC JOINT STATEMENT],
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-300200A1.pdf.
156
See FDA FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 1.
150
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regulate, the types of apps that it might not, what rules might apply to
regulated apps, and areas of lingering uncertainty that would benefit
from further public comment.157 For example, who among the
constellation of smartphone manufacturers, wireless providers, app
store portals, and app developers may have to answer to the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration? The guidance reassures these industries
that the FDA generally will withhold exercising jurisdiction over all
but the last group (app developers), thus absolving the Apples,
Googles, and Samsungs of the world that manufacture smartphones,
tablets, and the platforms on which they operate.158 Instead, the FDA
will train its eyes on those who create, design, label, or initiate
specifications for a mobile medical app.159
Second, the FDA’s guidance tries to delineate the types of apps that
it will and will not regulate. In fairness to the FDA, this is not at all
easy. As noted above, the statutory definition of “device” is a
functional one,160 and depends on whether the manufacturer intends
certain specified functionality.161 The FDA’s guidance clarifies that the
agency will assert jurisdiction over “mobile medical apps,” which it
defines as those apps that are intended to diagnose, cure, mitigate,
treat, or prevent diseases or other conditions, or affect the structure or
any function of the body.162 Again, many apps clearly qualify. Many
clearly do not. And many are entirely unclear.
The FDA’s guidance does an admirable job trying to translate the
technical definition of “device” and explain the opaque intended use
doctrine.163 But the app industry understandably remains confused,
calling for more clarity.164 To that end, the FDA introduced a pyramid
of jurisdiction.165 The pyramid itself represents the entire universe of
157

See id. at 4.
See id. at 9-10.
159
See id. at 9.
160
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act lists the things that can be “devices,”
including “an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in
vitro reagent,” or similar such objects that perform one of the listed functions. See 21
U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012). This includes components, parts, or accessories. Id.
161
See 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (2013).
162
See FDA FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 7-8.
163
See id. at 7-8. Several commenters at the Public Workshop noted that the Draft
Guidance is clearly aimed at smaller companies inexperienced with FDA regulations.
See, e.g., FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85 (presenting statements of Bernie
Liebler, AdvaMed, and Scott Thiel, who noted that this was the first FDA guidance
document that he could remember that listed specific regulations in the C.F.R. that
companies should recognize).
164
See FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85.
165
See BAKUL PATEL, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PUBLIC WORKSHOP — MOBILE
158
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health-related apps.166 It then divides into three tiers: (i) the top tier
representing “mobile medical apps” that meet the definition of
“device” and are either accessories to separate FDA-regulated devices
(such as a blood glucose monitor that plugs into an iPhone) or turn
the smartphone or tablet itself into a regulated device; (ii) the middle
tier representing apps that meet the technical definition of “device,”
but not the FDA’s narrower conception of “mobile medical apps,” over
which the FDA will exercise enforcement discretion; and (iii) a
bottom tier of health apps that do not meet the definition of “device”
and are thus beyond FDA jurisdiction.167
The middle and bottom tiers are worth understanding. At the
bottom, the Draft Guidance identifies a few species of non-regulated
apps. For example, the FDA is not concerned with apps that replicate
medical textbooks, reference materials, or teaching aids.168 The FDA is
also not concerned with apps that allow users to log and track their
general health or well-being, even if the app also suggests a course of
action.169 The classic examples (inasmuch as apps can be “classics”
already) are calorie trackers, appointment reminders, and exercise
regimens.170 Finally, the FDA says it is not concerned with apps that
replicate or automate office functions, like billing, reimbursement, and
the like.171 The one proviso, however, is that if any of these apps use
patient-specific data to generate customized diagnoses or treatment
recommendations, FDA jurisdiction would apply.172
But therein lies the gray area. Many medical apps apply a vast body
of accumulated medical knowledge to patient-specific inputs,
generating more granular diagnoses and treatments. All-in-one
diagnostic apps like Pocket Doctor and WebMD’s Symptom Checker
are the Precambrian ancestors of Tricorder-like devices. But the FDA
punts these for later guidance.173 The Draft Guidance, for example,
says that the FDA would continue to monitor apps that either
MEDICAL APPS DRAFT GUIDANCE 8 (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM271893.pdf.
166
See id.
167
See id. at 8; FDA FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 12,
20-25.
168
See FDA FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 18, 20.
169
See id. at 16.
170
See id. at 25.
171
See id. at 16.
172
See id. at 15.
173
The guidance also emphasizes that it does not address safety concerns with
wireless devices, and that it will issue separate guidances on related topics, including
apps that analyze data from multiple medical devices. See id. at 12, 16-18.
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“automate common medical knowledge available in the medical
literature,” “allow individuals to self-manage their disease or
condition,” or “automate common clinician’s diagnostic and treatment
tasks.”174 Thus, the FDA’s guidance does not even confront some of
the most provocative products.
At the same time, the FDA’s guidance states that it will regulate apps
that combine algorithms or formulae with patient information to
generate a patient-specific diagnosis or treatment recommendation to
be used in clinical practice.175 The line between this category and the
previous one is not very clear, and promises to blur even further as
developers envision new products with new functionalities. For
example, will the FDA regulate all-in-one diagnostic apps intended for
patient use? These apps might tell a parent whether to take a child to
the emergency room or not, or recommend other important actions
(or inaction), as the Scanadu example demonstrates.176 Part IV, below,
emphasizes the dangers of relying blindly on medical software.
Thus, the FDA says that it will regulate apps that obviously are
medical devices; that it will not regulate apps that obviously are not;
and that it will defer on the provocative middle tier of apps, over
which the agency will exercise enforcement discretion.177 Yet, at the
same time, the FDA “strongly recommends” that app manufacturers in
this gray area follow the FDA’s extensive Quality Systems
regulations,178 which require manufacturers to design and manufacture
their products in accordance with certain standards.179 Thus, in the
same breath, the FDA is telling certain mobile health products that
they may not fall within FDA jurisdiction, but that they should follow
FDA rules anyway.
This language pushes the FDA’s guidance well beyond its
disclaimers. The FDA makes clear that the guidance is a nonbinding
draft, intended only to solicit public comments.180 This caution is by
174

FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 12 n.13.
See id. at 14 (“[E]xamples include mobile apps that provide a questionnaire for
collecting patient-specific lab results and compute the prognosis of a particular
condition or disease, perform calculations that result in an index or score, calculate
dosage for a specific medication or radiation treatment, or provide recommendations
that aid a clinician in making a diagnosis or selecting a specific treatment for a
patient.”).
176
For a video vividly demonstrating the possibilities, and the certainty with which
apps promise to provide actionable advice, see SCANADU, supra note 1.
177
See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 12.
178
See 21 C.F.R. pt. 820.5 (2013).
179
See FDA FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 13.
180
See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 4.
175
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design. More than other agencies, the FDA must be explicit that its
guidance documents are not legally binding.181 Thus, as with most
FDA guidances, it features a sort of black box warning emphasizing
that the guidance, when finalized, will represent the FDA’s current
thinking on the topic and nothing more.182 Regulated firms are free to
take alternative approaches, as long as they comply with the
underlying statute and regulations.183 Of course, notwithstanding this
boilerplate, few people understand FDA guidance documents as being
so impotent.184
Shortly after it published the Draft Guidance, the FDA held a twoday public workshop to ventilate this framework.185 Some clear themes
emerged.
First, the FDA is well aware that it lacks technical expertise on
mobile technologies. Agency staff made several overtures expressing
technical deference to the app industry.186 In fact, anyone concerned
with the FDA’s tentative approach towards device software over the
last twenty-five years would view the agency’s comments as being
over-solicitous of those it is supposed to regulate.
Second, the app industry is relatively naïve to any kind of
regulation, not to mention the uniquely technical requirements
imposed by the FDA.187 Several comments by industry representatives
betrayed ignorance of even basic FDA rules, as well as profound
confusion with more advanced concepts like intended use.188
181
182
183

See 21 U.S.C. § 371(h) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 3(iv) (2013).
See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 4.
See id. The entire blurb reads:
This draft guidance when finalized will represent the Food and Drug
Administration’s (FDA’s) current thinking on this topic. It does not create or
confer any rights for or on any person and does not operate to bind FDA or
the public. You can use an alternative approach if the approach satisfies the
requirements of the applicable statutes and regulations. If you want to
discuss an alternative approach, contact the FDA staff responsible for
implementing this guidance. If you cannot identify the appropriate FDA
staff, call the appropriate number listed on the title page of this guidance.

Id.
184

See infra Part IV.B.
See FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85. FDA announced the public workshop
in August. Mobile Medical Applications Draft Guidance; Public Workshop, 76 Fed.
Reg. 50,231 (Aug. 12, 2011); see Mobile Medical Applications Draft Guidance; Public
Workshop; Correction, 76 Fed. Reg. 55,068 (Sept. 6, 2011).
186
See FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85.
187
See id.
188
See, e.g., id. (pointing out that Kerry McDermott, the Senior Policy Director of
185
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Third, the industry understandably wants the FDA to clarify which
apps it will and will not regulate.189 There were several suggestions
that the FDA should regulate apps based on the risks they present,
rather than their intended uses.190 This recommendation confuses the
first-order question of FDA jurisdiction with the second-order
question of how the FDA will regulate devices that fall under its
jurisdiction.191
Finally, the workshop revealed a near-consensus that mobile health
represents a genuine paradigm shift for our health care system.
Commenters observed that the real benefits of medical apps might
accrue to the next aging generation, not the current one.192 But this
was viewed as a matter of when, not if.
The comments also reflected a near-consensus that the FDA’s
regulatory authority might not map very well onto this technology.
For example, should the FDA require evidence that apps are safe and
effective before they are cleared for marketing?193 Would the user
reviews that typically appear at the point of sale (in app stores) be a
good indicator of whether the app is safe and effective?194 Will lowquality apps undermine the entire industry by eroding user
confidence?195 Would alternatives like private certification standards
be superior to centralized government oversight?196 Will consumers
trust apps just because they are cleared by the FDA?197 Will one-sizefits-all regulation work for such interactive, customized applications
that are frequently updated?198 Is it feasible to regulate medical apps at
all, given the sheer number of similar health applications already on
the Internet (for example, one commenter noted that a Google search
the West Wireless Health Institute, did not know what “intended use” was before the
workshop).
189
See id. (statement of Dave Eichler).
190
See id. (statement of Grant Elliott).
191
The FDA classifies devices based on risk, which determines how each device
may enter the market and the requirements that apply once it does. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c 2(c) (2012).
192
See FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85 (statement of Donna Tillman).
193
See id. (statement of John LaLonde).
194
See id. (providing the statement of Grant Elliott, which argues that users will
gravitate to apps that work and delete from their phones ones that do not).
195
See id.
196
Since the 2011 FDA workshop, private certification has spawned. For example,
Happtique offers perhaps the most well-known private sector certification program for
mobile health apps. See App Certification, HAPPTIQUE, http://www.happtique.com/appcertification/.
197
See FDA Public Workshop, supra note 85 (statement of Grant Elliott).
198
See id. (statement of Bernie Liebler).
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for “BMI calculator” generated 9,000 hits).199 Does the FDA need to
regulate at all if medical malpractice liability will encourage physicians
not to misuse or over-rely on apps?200
Of course, even the FDA’s relatively friendly Draft Guidance, which
bends over backwards to accommodate the industry, is criticized by
the industry for simultaneously being too burdensome and too vague.
For example, an industry group called the mHealth Regulatory
Commission submitted a 220-page comment to the FDA in response
to the Draft Guidance, in which it urged the agency to promote
innovation in the mobile health industry and reduce unnecessary
regulation.201
The FDA’s approach to mobile health also has been a frequent topic
in Congress. In May 2012, Senators Michael Bennet (D-CO) and Orrin
Hatch (R-UT) proposed an amendment to a pending FDA
appropriations bill that would have prohibited the FDA from finalizing
the Draft Guidance until September 2013,202 a proposal that some
industry groups opposed as introducing even more regulatory
uncertainty for the industry.203 Another proposed bill by
Representative Mike Honda (D-CA) took a different tack, by
recommending that the FDA create an entirely new center to facilitate
mobile health technologies.204 One bill that did become law simply
requires the FDA to coordinate with the FCC and the Office of the
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology to
recommend “an appropriate, risk-based regulatory framework

199

See id. (statement of Grant Elliott).
See id. (statement of Leslie Kelly Hall).
201
See Comments to FDA’s Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Applications: Docket
No. FDA-2011-D-0530, MHEALTH REGULATORY COMM’N 3-4 (Oct. 20, 2011), available at
http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/MRC-Commentson-FDA-Draft-MMA-Guidance.pdf.
202
See Brian Dolan, How Congress Almost Delayed the FDA’s Mobile Medical App
Guidance, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (July 5, 2012), http://mobihealthnews.com/17707/howcongress-almost-delayed-the-fdas-mobile-medical-app-guidance/.
203
Letter from Bradley Merrill Thompson, mHealth Regulatory Coalition, to Senator
Tom Harkin, Chairman, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, and Senator
Michael B. Enzi, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions (May 17, 2012), available
at
http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/MRC-Letter-toSenate-HELP-Committee-on-Proposed-Moratorium-FINAL.pdf. Congress passed the bill
without the amendment, instead requiring FDA to report on a risk-based approach
within 18 months. See Food and Drug Admin. Safety and Innovation Act of 2012
(FDASIA), Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 618(a), 126 Stat. 993, 1063.
204
The bill would have created an Office of Wireless Health at the FDA, among
other things. See Health Care Innovation and Marketplace Techs. Act of 2012, H.R.
6626, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012). The bill died in committee.
200
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pertaining to health information technology, including mobile medical
applications, that promotes innovation, protects patient safety, and
avoids regulatory duplication.”205
Then, in March 2013, the House Energy & Commerce Committee
held an unusual three days of hearings on the regulation of mobile
health technologies, which warned the FDA to provide regulatory
clarity without overregulating the industry.206 Again, the hearings
demonstrate the great faith policymakers have in mobile health and its
capacity to solve our health care system’s most pressing problems. The
message is clear  the FDA is not to stifle innovation in one of our
economy’s only bright spots.
In the meantime, the FDA continues to address mobile medical apps
as they arise. As noted above, the FDA has cleared the Reka E100 app,
which transmits data about cardiac events from an external event
recorder.207 The FDA cleared the iBGStar Diabetes Manager app, which
connects with a blood glucose meter.208 And it has cleared the Mobile
MIM app, which displays medical images for physicians, radiologists,
and technicians.209 Other companies are also seeking the FDA’s
blessing.210 As of March 2013, FDA officials report that the agency has
reviewed around 100 discrete medical apps,211 averaging roughly 110
205

FDASIA § 618(a). The FDASIA Working Group’s report is expected in 2013.
See Health Information Technologies: Harnessing Wireless Innovation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commc’s & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
113th Cong. 2 (2013), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/healthinformation-technologies-harnessing-wireless-innovation (statement of Robert Jarrin,
Senior Director, Government Affairs, Qualcomm Inc.).
207
These are Class II medical devices per 21 C.F.R. § 870.2340 (2014). FDA
approved the REKA E100 by Reka Ltd., in September 2011.
208
Sanofi-Aventis received FDA clearance for the iBGStar Diabetes Manager
Application (510(k) k103544). The document suggests that this is a Class I device
under 21 C.F.R. § 862.2100 (2014) (data processing module for clinical use).
209
These are Class II medical devices per 21 C.F.R. § 892.2050 (2014). The FDA
cleared the ImageGrid Radiology Viewer app by Candelis, Inc. in October 2009, the
Mobile MIM app by MIM Software, Inc. in February 2011, and the ASTRA by Candelis,
Inc. in September 2011. See Astra, 510(k) Summary of Safety (FDA Form 510(k)) (May
17, 2011), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf11/k111694.pdf; MIM Software
Inc., 510(k) Summary of Safety and Effectiveness (FDA Form 510(k)) (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf11/k112930.pdf; REKA Pte. Ltd., supra
note 59.
210
See Brian Dolan, Digital Health’s Busy Summer for FDA Clearances,
MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Aug. 14, 2012), http://mobihealthnews.com/18216/digital-healthbusy-summer-for-fda-clearances/.
211
Health Information Technologies: Administration Perspectives on Innovation and
Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm.
on Energy & Commerce, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Health Info. Admin.
206
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days with each review.212 And the agency finalized its Draft Guidance
in September 2013.213
Similarly, the FDA is tracking adverse events related to medical
apps, some of which portend future problems that might arise. For
example, in 2011 the FDA received a report that a neurostimulator
had malfunctioned because the patient had spent hours with an
iPhone near the head while the phone was in GPS (global positioning
system) mode.214 The neurostimulator thus turned off, but the patient
suffered no injury.215 Also in 2011, Pfizer alerted physicians in a “Dear
Doctor” letter that its popular Rheumatology Calculator app was
computing incorrectly, recalling it from the market.216 And in 2012,
Sanofi Aventis recalled a medical app for diabetics because the
software “could miscalculate an insulin dose potentially resulting in
dangerously low or high blood glucose levels in diabetic patients.”217
Both recalls were voluntary.
In May 2013, the FDA sent its first regulatory letter to a mobile
health company.218 The letter was directed to Biosense, maker of the
uCheck Urine analyzer app, used as an automated reader and
urinalysis program for reagent strips marketed by Bayer and
Siemens.219 The letter explained that the product qualifies as a medical
device and must be precleared by the FDA.220 The agency’s letter was
Perspectives Hearing], available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/healthinformation-technologies-administration-perspectives-innovation-and-regulation
(statement of Christy L. Foreman, Director, Office of Device Evaluation, FDA).
212
See Mital Letter, supra note 146, at 3.
213
See FDA FINAL GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24.
214
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MAUDE ADVERSE EVENT REPORT: MDT PUERTO
RICO OPERATIONS CO., JUNCOSRESTORE ULTRASTIMULATOR, SPINAL-CORD, TOTALLY
IMPLANTED FOR PAIN RELIEF (Aug. 23, 2011), available at http://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/TextSearch.cfm (document can be found by
selecting the year 2011, and searching for the keywords “Juncosrestore” and
“iPhone”).
215
See id.
216
See “Pfizer Rheumatology Calculator” iPhone/Android Application — Important
Information, PFIZER 1 (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.pharma-mkting.com/images/Pfizer_
Rheum_BugLetter.pdf.
217
Mital Letter, supra note 146, at 3; see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLASS 2
RECALL, SANOFI AVENTIS DIAMIGO IPHONE APP (Dec. 22, 2012), available at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfRES/res.cfm?id=114792.
218
See generally Letter from James L. Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient Safety & Prod.
Quality, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Myshkin Ingawale, Biosense Techs. Private Ltd.
(May 21, 2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/
Industry/ucm353513.htm (containing the full text of the letter).
219
See id.
220
See id.
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titled, awkwardly, as an “It Has Come To Our Attention Letter,” which
lacks the punch and publicity of the more traditional FDA Warning
Letters.221 Apparently, these letters are intended for private
consumption by well-meaning novices  although the Biosense letter
was widely disseminated as the FDA’s first foray into medical app
enforcement.222
Thus, the FDA marches forward, but timidly. The agency faces
distinct pressure from both Congress and the mobile health industry
to facilitate rather than regulate these new products. Patient safety and
consumer protection have not been the overriding concerns thus far.
Certainly, the first generation of medical apps does not seem overly
dangerous, particularly compared to the many drugs and devices
under the FDA’s jurisdiction. But, as Part IV demonstrates below, the
risks may be latent.
B. Other Agencies
As with many new technologies, multiple regulators have an interest
in mobile health. These agencies too have adopted a posture of
facilitating rather than regulating mobile health, with some
exceptions.
One exception is the Federal Trade Commission. Although the FTC
primarily is concerned that medical apps will compromise privacy and
data security,223 the agency also polices unsubstantiated product
claims, a charge it shares with the FDA. In 2011, the FTC brought two
maiden cases against medical apps that claimed to treat acne. The apps
(Acne Pwner and Acne App) flashed alternating colored lights from a
smartphone screen, which users were instructed to hold near their
faces.224 The FTC charged both with making unsubstantiated
221
See id.; see also Alexander Gaffney, FDA Sends Unusual Letter to Maker of iPhoneBased Testing Product, REGULATORY FOCUS (May 22, 2013), available at
http://www.raps.org/focus-online/news/news-article-view/article/3497.aspx.
222
See Gaffney, supra note 221.
223
See generally Overview of Federal Role in Mobile Health, HEALTHIT.GOV,
http://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/overview-federal-rolemobile-health (last visited June 24, 2013) (explaining the role of the FCC in mobile
health). Risks to patient privacy and data security are significant with mobile health
applications, but I do not address them here. Even apps that track sensitive health
information are not necessarily covered by federal privacy laws like HIPAA. Media
stories observe quite astutely that cell phones are “increasingly becoming a portable
medical record.” See Nancy Shute, Apps Can Help You Take a Pill, but Privacy’s a Big
Question, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/12/
01/143005028/apps-can-help-you-take-a-pill-but-privacys-a-big-question.
224
See Ann Carrns, F.T.C.: No App to Cure Acne, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2011),
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marketing claims, including one claim that a medical journal article
supported the treatment, when it did not.225 Acne Pwner was
downloaded 3,300 times for 99 cents each, and AcneApp was
downloaded 11,600 times at $1.99 each.226 Although the FTC’s fines
were modest (just $1,700 for Acne Pwner and $14,924 for
AcneApp),227 they demonstrated that the FTC would scrutinize health
claims made by apps.228 Still, it remains unclear how the FTC will
police less objectionable claims, or those supported by more credible
evidence. The FTC traditionally has been more lenient on therapeutic
claims than the FDA.229 In the meantime, the FTC has created a
Mobile Technology Unit to develop expertise on mobile apps and to
coordinate the agency’s mobile enforcement efforts.230
Outside the FDA and FTC, the third major agency that can claim
jurisdiction over medical apps is the Federal Communications
Commission, which regulates the radio frequencies used by mobile
devices.231 As such, the FCC already shares jurisdiction over wireless
medical devices like pacemakers.232 Perhaps for this reason, medical
apps have been on the FCC’s radar longer than other agencies, despite
the FCC’s relatively narrow charge here.
http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/f-t-c-no-app-to-cure-acne/?_r=0; Camille
Sweeney, Better Skin to the Touch?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/12/31/fashion/31Skinbox.html.
225
See Kobe Brown & Gregory W. Pearson, dba DERMAPPS, Analysis of Proposed
Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,041 (Sept. 15, 2011), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/09/110915kobebrownfrn.
pdf; Andrew N. Finkel, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 76
Fed. Reg. 57,043 (Sep. 15, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cases/2011/09/110915finkelanal.pdf.
226
See Carrns, supra note 224.
227
See id.
228
Note, however, that in 2012, an Administrative Law Judge for the FTC required
a lesser than usual standard of scientific proof for POM Wonderful, which claimed
that its products, derived from pomegranates, could address heart disease, prostate
cancer, or erectile dysfunction. In re POM Wonderful LLC, No. 9344, 2012 WL
2340406, at *1 (F.T.C. May 17, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2012/05/120521pomdecision.pdf (initial decision).
229
See PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 27576 (3d ed. 2007).
230
The Mobile Technology Unit, created by David Vladeck, resides in the Division
of Financial Practices of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. See Bureau of
Consumer Prot., Division of Financial Practices, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.
gov/bcp/bcpfp.shtm (last visited June 24, 2013).
231
See Pollard & Branham, supra note 45, at *6 (citing the Federal
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2012)).
232
See Overview of Federal Role in Mobile Health, supra note 223.
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In July 2010, the FCC and FDA jointly announced that they would
simultaneously try to promote wireless medical devices and ensure
that they are “safe, reliable and secure.”233 The agencies memorialized
this announcement in a Memorandum of Understanding.234 They then
hosted a public meeting, during which the FDA Commissioner and
FCC Chairman shared remarks about the tremendous potential of
wireless medical devices, followed by several industry panels.235 The
tone of the meeting was aspirational, preliminary, and introductory 
the speakers addressed how wireless medical devices work and how
they might be regulated.236
Since then, the FCC has remained engaged in mobile health. In
2012, the FCC announced that it would reserve additional spectrum
space for wireless medical body area networks (“MBANs”), which
devices and apps can use to constantly monitor patients.237 Indeed, the
FCC chairman’s remarks read like an industry brochure, suggesting
that wireless devices may save millions of lives and billions in health
spending.238 The FCC followed this announcement by hosting an
mHealth Summit, during which representatives from industry,
academia, and government (including the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, the FDA, the HHS, the National Institutes of
Health, and the Department of Veterans Affairs) discussed mobile
health devices.239 The FCC Chairman reiterated that “mHealth” is a
transformative, disruptive technology that may improve quality care,
lower costs, and save lives.240
233
FDA & FCC JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 155; see also Press Release, FCC, FDA
Take Steps to Promote Innovation and Investment in Wireless-Enabled Medical
Devices (July 26, 2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/DOC-300226A1.pdf.
234
See Memorandum of Understanding between the Fed. Commc’n Comm’n and
the U.S. Food & Drug Admin. Ctr. for Devices and Radiological Health (2010),
available at http:/hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-300200A2.pdf.
235
See FCC/FDA Joint Meeting on Life Saving Wireless Med. Tech. Day-1, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter FCC/FDA Joint Meeting], http://www.fcc.gov/
events/fccfda-joint-meeting-life-saving-wireless-medical-technology-day-1; Public Meeting:
Converged Commcations and Health Care Devices Impact on Regulation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.
(July
26–27,
2010),
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/
WorkshopsConferences/ucm215046.htm.
236
See generally FCC/FDA Joint Meeting, supra note 235 (providing a transcript of
Day 1 and Day 2 of the Joint Meeting).
237
See FCC, CHAIRMAN PROPOSAL, supra note 86, at 1.
238
See id. at 1-2.
239
See FCC, CHAIRMAN GENACHOWSKI, supra note 117, at 1.
240
See FCC CHAIRMAN JULIUS GENACHOWSKI, PREPARED REMARKS ON MED. BODY AREA
NETWORKS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. HOSP. 1 (May 17, 2012), available at
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In addition to the FDA, FTC, and FCC, several other agencies also
have medical apps on their radars.241 For example, the Department of
Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology has led
discussions about privacy and data security standards for medical
apps.242 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and its parent
agency HHS have created several programs to encourage physicians,
hospitals, and insurers to use health information technologies (known
as “health IT” or just “HIT”) to deliver safer, higher quality, and more
efficient care to patients.243 These programs encourage the industry to
use electronic records, prescribe medicines, coordinate patient care,
and measure quality outcomes electronically.244
Many of these efforts are superintended by the Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technology, situated within HHS
by the 2008 stimulus bill, whose charge is to promote a national
health IT infrastructure.245 In recent testimony, the National
Coordinator told Congress that health information technologies will
help transform “how care is paid for and delivered and how patients
engage in their own health.”246
Thus, contrary to regulatory alarmists who claim a federal assault on
mobile health technologies,247 the federal government is actively
promoting them, or at the very least is creating a very sympathetic
regulatory environment. To wit, some federal agencies have entire
programs dedicated to developing and promoting medical apps. The

http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-314145A1.pdf.
241
See Pollard & Branham, supra note 45, at *2.
242
See Overview of Federal Role in Mobile Health, supra note 223.
243
See Pollard & Branham, supra note 45, at *7-8 (surveying programs).
244
See id. (citing, among other programs, the Medicare Improvements for Patients
and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-275, 122 Stat. 2494, and the American
Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115).
245
See generally About ONC, OFF. OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO.
TECH., http://www.healthit.gov/newsroom/about-onc (last visited Feb. 8, 2014)
(providing a diagram about the structure of the Office and its mission). The American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, familiarly known as the “stimulus bill,”
included the HITECH Act (the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act) at Title XIII, which created the Office of the National Coordinator
within HHS. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-11 (2012)).
246
Health Info. Admin. Perspectives Hearing, supra note 211, at *25 (statement of
Farzad Mostashari).
247
See, e.g., Joel White, WHITE: FDA’s Assault on Mobile Technologies, WASH. TIMES
(Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/7/fdas-assault-onmobile-technologies/ (mischaracterizing the FDA’s Draft Guidance as a “proposed
regulation”).
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most prominent is the U.S. Department of Defense, which created a
National Center for Telehealth and Technology to evaluate mental
health technologies for military personnel.248 The program features
several apps, including: an app that helps physicians diagnose and
treat traumatic brain injuries and mental disorders;249 an app that
allows users to assess themselves for post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”);250 an app that uses clinical guidelines to help providers treat
mild traumatic brain injuries;251 and even an app that connects to EEG
devices, EMG devices, ECG/EKG devices, respirators, and other
biometric monitors.252 The U.S. Army runs a similar program, the
Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center, which
researches health informatics, mobile health, telemedicine, and
computational biology, among other things.253 The Center proclaims
that it is focused on “putting research findings into the hands of
warfighters while looking toward wider civilian utility.”254 As in
decades past, the U.S. military is at the forefront of medical
advancement.
Other federal agencies are also studying and promoting mobile
health. The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) and the National
Science Foundation recently convened an mHealth Evidence
Workshop to discuss how to gather scientific evidence to support
mobile health technologies.255 This is part of a larger program at HHS
248

See About T2, NAT’L CTR. FOR TELEHEALTH & TECH., http://www.t2.health.mil/
about.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
249
See Robyn Mincher, New Mobile App Helps Troops to Self-Manage Behavior,
Stress, NAT’L CTR. FOR TELEHEALTH & TECH. (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.t2.health.mil/
news/new-mobile-app-helps-troops-self-manage-behavior-stress#.UsEpI7TWubF.
250
This app was developed by the Department of Defense’s National Center of
Telehealth and Technology (T2) program, in collaboration with the Department of
Veteran Affairs’ National Center for PTSD. Notably, the app’s website says that: “The
assessment does not formally diagnose PTSD.” The app won the 2011 FCC
Chairman’s Awards for Advancement in Accessibility. See PTSD Coach, NAT’L CTR. FOR
TELEHEALTH & TECH., http://www.t2health.org/apps/ptsd-coach (last visited June 24,
2013).
251
This app was developed by the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychologic
Health and Traumatic Brain Injury. See mTBI Pocket Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR TELEHEALTH
& TECH., http://www.t2health.org/apps/mtbi (last visited June 24, 2013).
252
See BioZen, supra note 64 (disclaiming that “[t]hese devices and BioZen are not
designed or intended for psychological therapy or medical treatments”).
253
See Homepage, TELEMEDICINE & ADVANCED TECH. RES. CTR., http://www.tatrc.org/
(last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
254
Id.
255
See mHealth — Workshop on “mHealth Evidence,” OFF. OF BEHAVIORAL & SOC.
SCI. RES., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Aug. 16, 2011),
available at http://obssr.od.nih.gov/scientific_areas/methodology/mhealth/mhealth-
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and the NIH to subsidize research on mobile health applications.256 In
fact, the NIH itself offers several health-related apps.257
In short, federal agencies are assisting rather than assaulting mobile
health technologies. Even international bodies like the World Health
Organization (“WHO”) are examining the vast potential of mobile
health.258
Congress usually is the last to respond, and is so here. Although a
few congressional committees have considered medical apps, they
usually do so in passing.259 Only one statute has addressed them
directly,260 and that was to preserve the FDA’s Draft Guidance from
being frozen in carbonite by congressmen concerned with premature
regulation.261 Indeed, would-be regulators like the FDA and FCC have
workshop.aspx.
256
See mHealth — Mobile Health Technologies, OFF. OF BEHAVIORAL & SOC. SCI. RES.,
NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., available at
http://obssr.od.nih.gov/scientific_areas/methodology/mhealth/index.aspx (last visited
June 24, 2013).
257
See Gallery of Mobile Apps and Sites, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT’L INST.
HEALTH, available at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/mobile/ (last visited June 24, 2013).
258
See Global Observatory for eHealth, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/
goe/en/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). Note that like the FTC, the WHO’s regulatory
concerns focus on privacy and data security, rather than whether medical apps
actually work and do what they claim to do. See generally, Legal Frameworks for
eHealth: Global Observatory for eHealth Series — Vol. 5, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2012)
(focusing largely on privacy concerns, and questions regarding the extent of privacy
expected), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2012/9789241503143_
eng.pdf.
259
See The Impact of Medical Device and Drug Regulation on Innovation, Jobs, and
Patients: A Local Perspective: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 110-113 (2011) (statement of Rep. Brian P. Bilbray
comparing FDA regulation to a “red tide” that kills a health environment for
innovation); Overcoming Rural Health Care Barriers: Use of Innovative Wireless Health
Technology Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on
Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. 20-22, 29, 56-57, 72-75, 85 (2010); Aging in Place: The
National Broadband Plan and Bringing Healthcare Technology Home: Hearing Before the
S. Special Comm. on Aging, 111th Cong. 9, 37-38, 77 (2010). The one major exception
was the three-day hearing hosted by the House Energy & Commerce Committee in
March 2013. See supra note 206.
260
See Food and Drug Admin. Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112144, § 618(a), 126 Stat. 993, 1063.
261
In The Empire Strikes Back, Han Solo is frozen in carbonite, until he was
rescued in Return of the Jedi. STAR WARS EPISODE V: THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (20th
Century Fox 1980); STAR WARS EPISODE VI: RETURN OF THE JEDI (20th Century Fox
1983). The FDA’s Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Apps faced a similar fate. As
Congress considered the 2012 FDA user fee bill, Senators Michael Bennett (D-CO)
and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) proposed an amendment that would have prohibited the
FDA from finalizing its Draft Guidance until September 30, 2013. See Bennett-Hatch
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been upbraided by skeptical members of Congress for daring to
regulate some of these products.262
Thus, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, federal regulators are
sympathetic, not hostile, to mobile health. Again, this in itself is not
problematic, so long as this sympathetic posture does not sacrifice
meaningful oversight. Mobile health will only fulfill its immense
promise if federal regulators help ensure that the technologies are safe
and effective, and function as they claim.
IV. ENTERING THE REGULATORY FEEDBACK LOOP
The FDA’s response to mobile health is the continuation of a longer
narrative. The FDA, our country’s oldest consumer protection agency,
has long been oriented towards traditional food, drug, and device
products.263 But over the last twenty-five years, the FDA has had to
confront “laser age” products like computer software.264 Part IV, then,
tells the broader story of the FDA’s experience regulating computer
hardware and software over the last quarter-century, dating back to
the mid-1980s. I argue that the FDA risks repeating the same mistakes
it made when first addressing device software twenty-five years ago.
Mobile health, after all, simply represents the latest incarnation of
device software.
I argue that for the FDA to provide meaningful oversight of mobile
health, it must confront its longstanding posture towards medical
device software more generally, which has relied on nonbinding
guidance documents and spotty case-by-case enforcement.
Confronting past regulatory failures will push the FDA into a
regulatory “feedback loop,” in which the agency can identify past
shortcomings and initiate corrective and preventive actions in
response.265 History need not be doomed to repeat itself.
Amendment, 112th Cong., (2d Sess. 2012) (on file with author).
262
See, e.g., Letter from Marsha Blackburn et al. to Margaret Hamburg and Julius
Genachowski, supra note 125 (expressing concerns about the regulation process).
263
For a nice retrospective of the agency at its centennial, see FDA: A CENTURY OF
CONSUMER PROTECTION (Wayne L. Pines ed., 1st ed. 2006).
264
I used the rather dated phrase “laser age” as a nod to President Gerald Ford,
who used the phrase when he signed the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539, which ushered in the modern regulatory framework for
FDA oversight of devices: “The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 eliminate the
deficiencies that accorded FDA ‘horse and buggy’ authority to deal with ‘laser age’
problems.” Gerald R. Ford, U.S. President, Statement on Signing the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 (May 28, 1976), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=6069.
265
For another example of how the spigot of information can be adjusted to affect
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A. A Quarter-Century of Computerized Medicine
As with many regulatory interventions, the FDA’s foray into
software was prompted by tragedy.266 Between 1985 and 1987, a
radiation machine called the Therac-25 massively overradiated
patients in the United States and Canada, administering up to 100
times the prescribed dose, sometimes burning literal holes in patients’
bodies.267 The Therac-25 (an abbreviation for therapeutic radiation
computer) was notable for being the first radiation machine controlled
primarily by software.268 The manufacturer, Atomic Energy of Canada
Limited, designed the Therac-25 to rely on software, and thus chose to
remove the hardware failsafes from previous versions.269
The result was a cascade of errors. For example, the Therac-25’s
user interface displayed cryptic error alerts like “MALFUNCTION 54,”
which user manuals neglected to interpret.270 Persistent, daily
malfunctions eventually numbed users, making them impervious to
error alerts.271 In one episode, a patient died from a substantial
radiation overdose five months after the operator ignored repeated
error messages, some of which incorrectly warned of a substantial
FDA regulation of medical devices, see Lawrence O. Gostin, The Deregulatory Effects of
Preempting Tort Litigation, 299 JAMA 2313, 2313-15 (2008), which addresses how the
Supreme Court’s decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., holding that the FDCA’s scheme
for regulating devices preempts conflicting or additional state law tort claims, removes
civil discovery as a way to uncover unsafe or ineffective devices. Ironically, the very
idea of using a feedback loop to reorient the FDA’s strategy towards mobile health
derives in part from some of the same underlying thinking that now animates mobile
health. See, e.g., Thomas Goetz, Harnessing the Power of Feedback Loops, WIRED (June
19, 2011), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/06/ff_feedbackloop/5/ (discussing
how advances in sensory technology enables some of the mobile health monitoring
technologies discussed in Part I). I also owe this idea, in part, to the FDA’s own
“corrective and preventive action” (CAPA) system, which requires device
manufacturers to investigate manufacturing problems, correct them, and take action
to prevent their root causes. See Corrective and Preventative Action, 21 C.F.R.
§ 820.100 (2013).
266
The tragedy over thalidomide helped prompt the 1962 Drug Amendments. J.
Richard Crout, William W. Vodra & Cole P. Werble, FDA’s Role in the Pathway to Safe
and Effective Drugs, in FDA: A CENTURY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 263,
at159, 168-69; see DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE
AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 256-60 (2010).
267
For a comprehensive story of the Therac-25 saga, see NANCY G. LEVESON,
Medical Devices: The Therac-25, in NANCY G. LEVESON, SAFEWARE: SYSTEM SAFETY AND
COMPUTERS App. A (1995).
268
See id. at 3.
269
See id.
270
See id. at 17.
271
See id. at 7.
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underdose.272 The manufacturer was overconfident in patching
software errors, even though it could not identify their root causes
when pressed to do so.273 Users developed a false sense of security that
the Therac-25’s software would make it “virtually impossible to
overdose a patient.”274 Indeed, the complacency was so entrenched
that the initial reaction by radiation technicians, hospital physicists,
and the manufacturer to patient complaints (“You burned me!”) was
widespread disbelief (“That’s impossible.”).275 The manufacturer’s first
safety review of the Therac-25 did not even cover its software.276
Subsequent investigations and lawsuits revealed all types of bugs 
including, astoundingly, typing too fast, and moving the cursor up,
both of which caused crashes and errors  as well as fundamental
software design flaws.277
When the FDA investigated these incidents, it required Atomic
Energy to make several corrections, which were not fully implemented
until after a recall two years later.278 The Therac-25 had entered the
U.S. market via a 510(k) notification, by which the FDA cleared the
device as being “substantially equivalent” to a predicate already on the
market, despite its unprecedented reliance on software.279 The Therac25, like many software-driven devices today, was not subject to
meaningful premarket review.
The Therac-25 episode has since become a standard university case
study in software failure.280 The authoritative report on it concluded
that “[t]here seems to be a feeling among nonsoftware professionals
that software will not or cannot fail, which leads to complacency and
overreliance on computer functions.”281 At the time, the FDA’s
response was considered “impressive,” given that it had no policy for
medical software.282
That began to change as a direct result of the Therac-25. In 1986,
the FDA Commissioner Frank Young first announced in a speech that
272

See id. at 17-18.
See id. at 13, 16, 19.
274
Id. at 8.
275
See id. at 9, 15, 18.
276
See id. at 8.
277
See id. at 20-28.
278
See id. at 29, 40.
279
Id. at 29.
280
See Simson Garfinkel, History’s Worst Software Bugs, WIRED (Nov. 8, 2005),
http://www.wired.com/software/coolapps/news/2005/11/69355.
281
LEVESON, supra note 267, at 44.
282
Id. at 48.
273
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the agency would approach software with the “least regulation
consistent with the requirements of public health and safety.”283
Shortly thereafter, in 1987, the FDA published its first draft policy on
software.284 In 1989, the FDA updated the document, which became
known as the “Draft Software Policy.”285 The policy confirmed that the
FDA’s “basic philosophy for computer products is to apply the least
degree of regulatory control necessary to provide reasonable assurance
of safety and effectiveness.”286 Since then, the FDA’s approach to
computerized devices has been the archetype of regulatory
minimalism.
Like the 2011 Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Applications, the
1989 policy delineated which computer products the agency would
and would not regulate.287 Both guidances tried to clarify how new
technologies might fit into the statutory definition of “device,” written
by Congress in 1976 when no one could have imagined today’s
versions.288
A key idea introduced in 1987 was that of “competent human
intervention.”289 The FDA explained that it would exempt from
regulation artificial intelligence and clinical decision support software
as long as it allowed ample time for competent human intervention by
the user.290 For example, the FDA would be more concerned with a
computer program that alerted nurses to “Inject Dose Now!” than one
recommending well ahead of time that nurses administer the dose at
certain intervals, with opportunity for the nurse to consider those
instructions. The distinction is whether “clinical judgment and
experience can be used to check and interpret a system’s output”
283
Suzan Onel, Draft Revision of FDA’s Medical Device Software Policy Raises Warning
Flags, MEDICAL DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUS. (Oct. 1, 1997), http://www.mddionline.
com/article/draft-revision-fdas-medical-device-software-policy-raises-warning-flags.
284
See Draft Policy Guidance for Regulation of Computer Products; Availability, 52
Fed. Reg. 36,104 (Sept. 25, 1987). The FDA began crafting the policy in 1985. See
Medical Devices; Medical Software Devices; Notice of Public Workshop, 61 Fed. Reg.
36,886 (July 15, 1996); Onel, supra note 283.
285
See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 5; FDA
DRAFT SOFTWARE POLICY, supra note 22, at *1-3.
286
E. Stewart Crumpler & Harvey Rudolph, FDA Software Policy and Regulation of
Medical Device Software, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 511, 513 (1997).
287
See FDA DRAFT SOFTWARE POLICY, supra note 22, at *2-3.
288
See Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act § 201(h), 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2012); Medical
Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 513, 90 Stat. 539, 540-46; see also
Ford, supra note 264.
289
Draft Policy Guidance for Regulation of Computer Products, 52 Fed. Reg.
36,104.
290
See FDA DRAFT SOFTWARE POLICY, supra note 22, at *2.
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before “any impact on human health.”291 As discussed below, this
distinction is neat but facile.
The FDA never finalized the 1989 Draft Software Policy, and
ultimately withdrew it in 2005.292 Nevertheless, during the past
twenty-five years, lawyers have advised clients largely based on the
1989 policy (even after being withdrawn), largely because this was the
only concrete guidance available. Ironically, after the FDA withdrew
the 1989 guidance, the agency explained that “it would be impractical
to prepare an overarching software policy to address all of the issues
related to the regulation of all medical devices containing software”
because “the use of computer and software products as medical
devices grew exponentially and the types of products diversified and
grew more complex.”293 Thus, rather than providing more firm
guidance as medical technology matured  during a profound
computer revolution, no less  the FDA provided less.
Although the FDA avoided announcing an overarching approach to
software, it has exercised jurisdiction over various software devices on
a case-by-case basis.294 For example, the FDA has created dozens of
regulatory categories for devices that incorporate software, including
medical calculators, cameras, lights, magnifiers, microscopes,
monitors, recorders, reminders, scales, surgical tools, transmitters, and
a host of data systems that store, display, and manipulate
information.295 Many mobile applications will fall into one of these
preexisting categories.296 But many will fit uneasily, or not at all. And
in such cases, the FDA might have to create entirely new categories,

291

See id.
See Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug
Admin., 70 Fed. Reg. 824, 890 (Jan. 5, 2005).
293
FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 5 (referring to
the 2005 withdrawal of the 1989 Draft Software Policy).
294
See id.
295
See id. app. B at 21-23 (listing 79 distinct device categories codified by the
FDA).
296
For example, the Draft Guidance identifies several existing categories that
might fit many medical apps, including 21 C.F.R. §§ 880.6310 (devices that display,
store, or transmit patient-specific medical device data in its original format),
870.1875(b) (electronic stethoscope), 892.2050 (picture archiving and
communications system), 862.1345 (glucose test system), 870.2300 (cardiac
monitor), 870.1130 (electronic blood pressure monitor), 884.2740 (perinatal
monitoring system), and 868.1890 (drug dose calculator), to name just those
identified by the FDA in its Guidance. See id. at 14-15.
292
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adding to the roughly 1,700 different device categories in the Code of
Federal Regulations.297
But by and large, the FDA has avoided proceeding by rule here. It
has promulgated very few prospective regulations governing software,
and what little it has done addresses relatively low-risk devices.298 For
example, in 2011, the FDA finalized a regulation governing medical
device data systems (“MDDS”),299 a narrow slice of products that
simply transfer, store, display, or convert medical device data without
doing much else, like analyzing the data or even charting it visually.300
Indeed, to qualify as an MDDS, a product may not feature alarms or
actively monitor patient data that a health care practitioner might use
to make immediate treatment decisions.301 Undoubtedly, many mobile
applications will qualify as MDDSs because they do nothing more than
store, display, and transfer data. But these devices should not concern
us much.
Periodically, in the preambles to final rules, the FDA will
acknowledge computer products. For example, when finalizing its
Quality System regulation (“QSR”) for devices in 1996, the FDA
observed that software design flaws and the failure to validate software
after maintenance were the most common sources of software
errors.302 The QSR, which establishes good manufacturing practices for
devices,303 has been perhaps the one area in which the FDA has
provided firm standards for device software. But the QSR is notable for
giving manufacturers significant flexibility to design and manufacture
devices according to customized specifications.304 This is both a
297

See 21 C.F.R. pts. 862-892 (2013).
For example, in 2011, the agency promulgated a rule classifying devices that
electronically display, store, transfer, or convert medical device data, known as
Medical Device Data Systems (“MDDS”). Medical Devices; Medical Device Data
Systems, 76 Fed. Reg. 8637 (Feb. 15, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 880.6310
(2013)).
299
See id.
300
See id. at 8643-44 (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 880.6310(a)).
301
See id. at 8644.
302
See Medical Devices, Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) Final Rule;
Quality Systems Regulation, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,602 (Oct. 7, 1996). See U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., CURRENT GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR
COMBINATION PRODUCTS 31-33 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
CombinationProducts/UCM336194.pdf (explaining how to comply with QSR
requirements and noting that many comments applying the requirements focused on
design controls).
303
See 21 C.F.R. pt. 820 (2013).
304
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MEDICAL DEVICES, QUALITY SYSTEM (QS)
REGULATION/MEDICAL DEVICE GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICES (2011), available at
298
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strength and a weakness  a strength in recognizing the diversity of
medical devices and the implausibility of generating one-size-fits-all
standards, but a weakness in decentralizing standards and delegating
significant discretion to regulated firms. Of course, the FDA relies on
guidance to explain how the QSR applies to software.305
By and large, FDA oversight of software relies on guidance. Agency
documents that summarize the FDA’s approach to software generally
cite to the same cluster of five guidances.306 Following this tradition,
the Draft Guidance on Mobile Medical Applications cites to the same
five guidances, as well as four others discussing basic device
regulations.307 The Draft Guidance also cites to over a dozen
international standards published by groups like the International
Electrotechnical Commission, the Institute for Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, and the International Organization for
Standardization.308
Together, these documents form a cascade of quasi-regulation,
recommendations, and “current thinking,” but few firm rules.
Software does not stand on terra firma with the FDA. Looking back,
the 1987 document was like a gateway drug that led to guidance after
guidance for the next quarter-century. But the FDA’s response to
software has not been commensurate with how ubiquitous and critical
software has become.
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/PostmarketRequire
ments/QualitySystemsRegulations/default.htm.
305
See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SOFTWARE
VALIDATION: FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF (2002) [hereinafter FDA
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SOFTWARE VALIDATION], available at http://www.fda.gov/
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm085281.htm
(containing the guidelines of how the QSR applies to software).
306
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR THE CONTENT OF PREMARKET
SUBMISSIONS FOR SOFTWARE CONTAINED IN MED. DEVICES (2005); U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CYBERSECURITY FOR NETWORKED MED. DEVICES
CONTAINING OFF-THE-SHELF SOFTWARE (2005); FDA GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SOFTWARE
VALIDATION, supra note 305; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FDA
REVIEWERS, AND COMPLIANCE ON OFF-THE-SHELF SOFTWARE USE IN MEDICAL DEVICES
(1999); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DESIGN CONTROL GUIDANCE FOR MEDICAL DEVICE
MANUFACTURERS (1997).
307
See FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS, supra note 24, at 16 (citing
guidelines on overall regulation of devices and marketing devices); id. at 24 (citing
guidance on scheduling meetings with the FDA to discuss device classifications); id. at
26 (citing guidelines on how to report adverse events); id. at 27 (citing guidelines for
recalls and removals); id. at 28-29 (citing nine FDA guidances and fourteen
international ones).
308
These generally govern the use of software and electrical equipment,
particularly in medical devices. See id.
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B. “The Wonders and Brutality” of Innovation
The Therac-25 saga not only prompted the FDA’s attention to
software, but also presaged the next quarter-century of torrential
innovation in computerized medicine. An agency long oriented
towards more traditional products responded impressively in the
absence of an overarching policy for software.309
Yet, after twenty-five years with such a policy, history repeats itself.
Between 2009 and 2011, the New York Times documented several
hundred catastrophic injuries caused by software and user errors
related to the newest generation of radiation machines.310 The
incidents bear striking resemblance to the Therac-25 saga two decades
earlier, demonstrating the “wonders and the brutality”311 of medical
innovation.
In one case, St. Vincent’s Hospital in Manhattan exposed a 41 yearold tongue cancer patient to fatal doses of radiation for three
consecutive days after the software repeatedly crashed.312 The medical
physicist operating the machine had calibrated it to target cancerous
tissue at the base of the patient’s tongue, without damaging
surrounding healthy tissue  precisely the allure of new intensity
modulated radiation therapy devices, which use complex software to
beam radiation at cancerous tissue and little else.313 But after repeated
error messages and software crashes, the machine erased the
coordinates that would have shaped the beam; instead, it administered
unmodulated radiation to his entire neck and the base of his skull,
including the brain stem.314 The overdose “left him deaf, struggling to
see, unable to swallow, burned, with his teeth falling out, with ulcers
in his mouth and throat, nauseated, in severe pain and finally unable
to breathe.”315 He died roughly two years after the mistake.316

309

See LEVESON, supra note 267, at 48.
See generally Radiation Boom, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/
us/series/radiation_boom/index.html (last visited June 24, 2013) (linking to several
articles in the “Radiation Boom” series by Walt Bogdanich which examine issues
arising from the increasing use of medical radiation and the new technologies that
deliver it).
311
I borrow this phrase from Walt Bogdanich, Radiation Offers New Cures, and
Ways to Do Harm, N.Y. TIMES 1 (Jan. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Radiation Offers New
Cures], http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/health/24radiation.html.
312
See id.
313
See id. at 3, 4.
314
See id. at 4.
315
Id.
316
See id. at 3.
310
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In another case, a 32 year-old breast cancer patient at the State
University of New York’s Downstate Medical Center in Brooklyn was
administered three and a half times the prescribed dose of radiation
each session for 27 days.317 She was the victim of “a baffling series of
missteps,”318 again eerily reminiscent of the Therac-25. A radiation
therapist had misprogrammed the device, which in turn omitted a
metallic wedge that would have shaped the beam. Other therapists and
staff then failed to catch the mistake, both when reviewing the
patient’s treatment records, and more disturbingly, when an alert
(“wedge OUT”) was displayed on the computer screen during her
treatment.319 The N.Y. Department of Public Health observed, “[t]he
fact that therapists failed to notice ‘wedge OUT’ on 27 occasions is
disturbing.”320 The radiation seared a hole in her chest, which grew
until her rib bones were openly visible.
The Times reporters documented hundreds of similar mistakes: 90
prostate cancer patients at a hospital in Philadelphia misdosed with
radiation; 77 brain cancer patients at a hospital in Florida overdosed;
36 cancer patients at a veterans hospital in New Jersey overdosed; 260
patients at a hospital in Los Angeles who received eight times more
radiation than designed.321 The reporters comprehensively studied just
one state (New York), and found 621 documented mistakes between
2001 and 2008, including 133 incidents of incorrectly shaped beams,
284 incidents in which “radiation missed all or part of its intended
target or treated the wrong body part entirely,” and 50 incidents in
which “patients received radiation intended for someone else.”322
These spot reports align with nationwide estimates that one in twenty
radiation patients will suffer injury.323
A hospital official at St. Vincent’s said the incident above “occurred
as a result of a unique and unanticipated combination of issues.”324 But
317

See id.
Id. at 5.
319
See id.
320
Id. at 6.
321
See id. at 1; see also Walt Bogdanich, As Technology Surges, Radiation Safeguards
Lag, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2010) [hereinafter As Technology Surges], http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/01/27/us/27radiation.html?pagewanted=all.
322
Bogdanich, Radiation Offers New Cures, supra note 311, at 2.
323
See id. at 1 (quoting Dr. John J. Feldmeier).
324
Id. at 4. As Nancy Leveson’s work emphasizes, these types of events are indeed
often unanticipated, but far from unanticipatible. See, e.g., NANCY G. LEVESON,
ENGINEERING A SAFER WORLD: SYSTEMS THINKING APPLIED TO SAFETY (2011) (using
systems theory to discuss software engineering in increasingly complex
environments).
318
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it was neither unique nor unanticipated. These incidents, dating back
to the Therac-25, largely germinate from two related sources: software
failures and user errors.
C. “To Really Screw Things Up, You Need a Computer”
Old medical software problems still persist  serial system crashes,
user impatience that leads to quick bypasses, user fatigue with error
alerts, misplaced trust in the software, and utter disbelief that these
technologically advanced, highly calibrated machines could err so
badly.325 And as radiation technology becomes increasingly powerful,
it requires more sophisticated software that itself requires more
sophisticated users.326 The problems will compound.
Hospitals and specialty practices can be quick to adopt new
technologies. But they often do so without a corresponding increase in
the personnel and resources required to use them properly. American
medicine has long embraced unproven new technologies that are later
shown to be ineffective, or worse, unsafe.327 But health providers are
not solely to blame. As Einer Elhauge notes, technology excites us,
and “[c]onsumers often irrationally demand new technologies that
have no demonstrable benefit.”328 In short, health providers seem
particularly susceptible to novelty, consumer demand, and
manufacturer claims.329 We see glimpses of this in the exuberance over
mobile health.
When things do go wrong, responsibility dissipates. Providers blame
manufacturers. Manufacturers blame user errors. Federal, state, and
local regulators with overlapping jurisdiction remain inert.
The one thing they have in common is overlooking the interaction
between software and humans. Manufacturers often design software
that is confusing or downright hostile to users. Software users do not
always operate in ideal conditions. They might be harried, distracted,
325

On this latter point, St. Vincent’s Hospital in Manhattan was so dismissive that
when the wife of the tongue cancer patient reported serious problems with her
husband, it sent a psychiatrist to see her. See Bogdanich, Radiation Offers New Cures,
supra note 311, at 4.
326
See id. at 1 (“[L]inear accelerators and treatment planning are enormously more
complex than 20 years ago,” quoting Dr. Howard I. Amols, chief of clinical physics at
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center).
327
See Einer Elhauge, The Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology
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or frustrated, or some combination of the three. Regulators focus
myopically on their own narrow sphere of jurisdiction  either the
device itself or the licensed user  but rarely both. As the Institute of
Medicine reminded us: “To Err Is Human.”330 But, as a federal official
quipped during the FDA’s public workshop on medical apps, the
subtitle to the Institute’s report should have been “To Really Screw
Things up, You Need a Computer.”331 Another physician researcher
testified at the workshop that errors and “never events” associated
with software technologies are generally caused by design flaws,
defective coding, interoperability conflicts, and user errors.332
Some skeptics are sounding the alarm, requesting real data that
mobile health applications actually do what they claim.333 As the
researcher testified, “Like a lot of things in medicine, when you
actually test it in a randomized controlled trial, you may find out it
doesn’t work . . . Optimism is not a substitute for rigorous trials.”334
This is precisely the FDA’s charge, and it is particularly important with
new software technologies.
We are dangerously predisposed to believe computers. We believe
they are error-resistant, even infallible.335 And this mindset, known as
“automation bias,” disarms us from critically evaluating potential
errors.336 In fact, research demonstrates that we trust automation even
when we suspect errors or malfunctions,337 a reality made crystalline
by the radiation examples above.
The allure of automation is that it represents rule-bounded, binarycoded clarity. Automation has a reductionist allure  software at its
core is ones and zeroes and nothing in between. But automated
330
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systems are usually inaccessible and opaque to the non-programmer,
which often “shields them from scrutiny.”338 Such scrutiny should
come from the FDA.
Indeed, the agency seems to be well aware of the dangers posed by
computerized devices. In February 2010, the FDA revealed during a
public meeting that it had received voluntary reports of 260
malfunctions, 44 injuries, and six deaths related to health information
technologies.339 Errors included mixing different patients’ data,
accessing incorrect data, losing or corrupting data, errors in
computing and analyzing data (like calculating wildly incorrect
medication dosages), and compatibility errors between different types
of software and computer systems.340 Because these were voluntary
reports, and because even the FDA’s mandatory reporting
requirements suffer from dramatic under-reporting,341 the real
numbers are no doubt much higher.
Unfortunately, the FDA’s posture towards software is reactive rather
than proactive. To wit, FDA and local regulators confronted by the
New York Times series on radiation mistakes opened subsequent
investigations.342
Mobile health applications, of course, are not yet capable of
inflicting the “unspeakable pain” that radiation machines can.343 But as
history demonstrates, medical software gradually becomes more
ubiquitous and critical to patient safety, not less.
Consider that device software currently struggles at even basic
things, like keeping accurate time. A surprisingly large number of
clocks used by medical devices and hospitals are wrong, sometimes by
thirty minutes or more.344 A study by Julian Goldman reviewed the
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clocks used by 1,700 medical devices.345 He found that only three
percent of the clocks were within three seconds of actual time, and 20
percent deviated by more than 30 minutes, with the average clock 24
minutes off.346 The devices he studied were located in four prestigious
east coast hospitals.347
These types of time-keeping errors may seem trivial, but evidence
suggests that they are both common and costly. In 2007, a researcher
in Vienna studied 113 intensive care units in 27 countries, and found
that almost half of all mistakes in administering intravenous drugs
were timing errors.348 A simple solution has existed since 1985 
using a Network Time Protocol that cell phones use to synchronize
time to atomic clocks.349 But the FDA has never required devices to
use this technology.350 HHS has proposed regulations that would
require it for electronic medical records, but they would not phase in
until 2014.351
As alluring as medical innovation is, it is not an unmitigated good.
The role of regulators is to facilitate the benefits of new technologies
and manage their risks. Doing so should support long-term markets
for the technology, preserve consumer trust, and level the playing field
among competitors. One goal of this Article is to push the FDA
towards a regulatory feedback loop, in which the agency confronts
broader, longstanding problems with software oversight and corrects
them going forward, particularly as it oversees emerging technologies
like mobile health.
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CONCLUSION
Rarely does a class of technologies excite physicians, patients,
financeers, gadgeteers, and policymakers alike. But for mobile health
to begin to reach its immense potential  saving millions of lives,
cutting billions in spending, and democratizing medicine  federal
regulators will have to provide meaningful oversight, ensuring that
these technologies are safe and effective. For this to happen, the FDA
will first have to confront its long history of piecemeal oversight of
medical device software. If the FDA does so, it can enter a regulatory
feedback loop, through which the agency can begin to craft
enforceable policies that not only ensure the safety and efficacy of
mobile health technologies, but also facilitate the long-term health of
this promising market.352
This Article tries to draw attention to the major legal and regulatory
challenges presented by mobile health. Obviously, there are many
more avenues of inquiry. For example, in the health policy literature
alone, there are looming questions about how mobile health might
disturb existing legal and regulatory frameworks governing how we
finance, deliver, and measure the quality of care. There are also
troubling questions, largely untouched here, about the lack of privacy
and data security in mobile health applications, their integration with
electronic health records, and the dangers of “big data” in the health
care sphere.353 If the mobile health revolution has really begun, we
must now grapple with it.
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